1 

i 


1 







11 



K<>:.....,2 



^0 o 



-,^j, v*- 






-%- .<^ 






\^' 



^^^^ .-' 





•^^ 


0^ 




;> - ^. >> 


\ 






'^-^^. 














1 ,, 




;^<^ 





'■S-, .<^ 



a\ 



V- 






'/- 



'%..^ 



^^/^ 



vvV -^V. 



.^^^ 









-^^ 



A>' -^. 



<^.^ r 
^^'' - 



o^ ■<-'. 



■■/• \\ 






V "-■ 



^0 O^ 



FRANCE 



AND THE 



AMERICAN R E \' L U T I O N 



i7'j^-'77^^ 



A thesis presented to the Fac-it>- of Corneil Uni\-ersity for the 
degree of D^xtor of Philosophy. J.nt. i^iigs. 



fcV 



LALFA CHARLOTTE SHELbON 



AXljRrS 4; Cm.'RCH 

ITHACA. N. V 

1900 



CON T 1<: NTS. 

chapt]';r 1. 
Forecasts of Rhvolution i 

CHAl'TIvR II. 

Aid for Amkrica 

3 

CHAPTER III. 
The Beginning of Dii'Lomatic Relations 30 

CHAPTER IV. 

The Demand for Recognition 46 

CHAPTER V. 
Thf; Conclusion of the Tricaty 60 



P R Iv F A C R . 



In this study of the circninstaiices which led to the 
Franco-American alliance of 1778, without hopinj:^ to attain 
minuteness of analysis, I have tried to show the princi])al 
motives of France, and to suj^j^^est how they were nuxlified 
by the influence of Spain. In dealing with the American 
side of the story, no attempt has been made to do more than 
hint at the political complications which, beginnin" in this 
early period, produced their most important results in the 
later stages of the war. 

The most helpful documents easily accessii)le for the 
study of this topic are : on the American side, Wharton's 
Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence, the Journals of 
Congress, and the writings of the statesmen concerned ; on 
the r'rench, Mr. B. F. Stevens' great collection of Fac- 
similes, and the original material contained in M. Doniol's 
important but biased history. These may be supplemented 
by the manuscript collections of Mr. Jared Sparks and Mr. 
George Bancroft. The letters published by DeWitt in his 
study of Jefferson may also be found among the Sparks 
manuscripts. The vSpanish documents have been consulted 
in English and French translations. 

I wish to acknowledge my indebtedness to Mr. Thomas 
J. Kiernan of the Harvard Library, Mr. Wilberforce Fames 
of the Ivcnox Library, and Mr. Robbins Little, formerly of 
the Astor Library, for their kindness in giving me access to 
valuable collections ; and also to thank the officers of the 
Cornell Library for favors continued during the revision of 
this thesis. 

Laura C. Sheldon. 



I. 

KORI'CAvSTvS OF RI-N'OLUTION. 



The agreeniciit made between France ul the United 
States in 1778, thongh a welcome relief to struggling patriots 
in America and a source of joy to Repnblican enthusiasts in 
France, did n)t, in either country, lack critics to condemn it 
as an unnatural alliance. In view of the wars which had 
sundered F^renchmen and Fjiglishmen for nearly a centurx', 
the feeling was inevitable ; yet those who deliberatel\' called 
this miion of enemies a natural alliance had wiser political 
insight. They saw that the transfer of Canada to Kngland 
in 1763 had opened the way for a friendshi]i between F^ngiish 
America and FVance. 

Early in the series of contests, here and there an onlooker 
had dimly seen that the relation l)etween Kngland and her 
thirteen Colonies depended on whether FVance or Kngland 
held Canada. Two opposite predictions were made : one, 
that Ivngland, if she should conquer Canada, would follow 
up the victory by tightening her grasp on her own Colonies ; 
the other, that she would soon lose them altogether. Toward 
the close of Queen Anne's War, an enterprising F'reiich 
officer formed a plan for winning the Knglish Colonists to the 
side of France : namely, to jiersuade them that the troops 
which Kngland was sending to their shores were designed, not 
for the conquest of their enemy, but for their own subjuga- 
tion ; and that, if New France should fall into the hands of 
Kngland, their lil)erties would be destroyed. The French 
colonial minister approved of the scheme. " It is much to 
be w'ished," he wrote, " that the Council at Boston coidd be 
informed of the designs of the F"nglish Court, and shown 
how important it is for that province to remain in the state 
of a republic. The King would even approve <nir helping 
it to do so." In furtherance of this policy, an emissar\- was 
sent to Boston in 171 1, to treat with the Colonies as an inde- 



2 France and the Anierica)i Revolution . 

pendent people and arrange a mutual cessation of hostilities, 
on condition that they should give England no more aid ; 
but when he arrived on the enemy's coast, his vessel was 
seized, and his mission came to an ignominious end.' 

At about this time another Frenchman, with wiser fore- 
sight, was predicting the actual results of the British policy. 
" Old England," he said, alluding to the possible conquest 
of Canada and its influence on the thirteen Colonies, " will 
not imagine that these variotis provinces will then unite, 
shake off the yoke of the English monarchy, and erect them- 
selves into a democracy." " A generation later, in 1748, the 
Swedish traveller, Kalm, believed that the presence of the 
French in Canada was the main security for England's re- 
tention of Iier Colonies.'^ Before the close of the Seven 
Years' War, French and English statesmen alike were pre- 
dicting that the transfer of Canada to England would be 
followed by the revolt of the British Provinces ; for their in- 
habitants, released from constant dread of a hostile neighbor 
and no longer in need of support from England, w^ould be 
free to luirse their grievances against her. The Count de 
Vergennes, who was to direct the foreign affairs of France 
during the American Revolution, foretold the crisis in which 
he afterward found his opportunity. " England," he said, 
" will ere long repent of having removed the only check that 
could keep her colonies in awe. They stand no longer in 
need of her protection. vShe will call on them to contribute 
toward supporting the burdens they have helped to bring on 
her, and they will answer by striking off all dependence." ^ 

In 1763, the long contest for empire ended in the triumph 
of England and the expulsion of France from the North 
American continent. With her chief colonial possessions 
torn away, her army weakened, and her navy almost 
destroyed, France suddenly found her.self in the position of 
a minor power. Her humiliation brought with it not even 

' rarkmaii, .A. Half-Century of CoiiHict, I, ])p. 150 ff. 
'^Ibid. I, p. 155. Quoted from an anonymous memorial of 1710, 
171 1. 
^Lecky, Knj.;lan(] in the Kighteenth Century, III, p. 291. 
* Bancroft, History of the United vStates, 11, p. 564. 



Forecasts of Revolution . 3 

the pDor comfort of security : for I^uglaiul was. in the eyes 
of the French Ministry, a treacherous opponent, disposed to 
take ever}' advantage of a concpiered enemy ; ready, for 
any hope of gain, to reopen the war, under her own prece- 
dent, without tlie forniahty of a declaration. If Choiseul, 
at this time the most influential minister of France, not only 
tried to strengthen his conntr\- Ijy forming alliances and 
building up a new navy, Init w.itched for an opportunity to 
strike an underhand blow at Ivngland tlirough her Colonies ; 
if Vergennes, a few years later, built up for her discomfiture 
a consistent policy of deception, their excuse must be .sought 
in the desperate plight of France and in previous wanderings 
from the i>ath of international virtue on the part of ICngland. 
" Power can never render honorable that which is not hon- 
orable," — so wrote a contemporary of these men — '"and in 
politics, everything which is not avowed, everything which 
is not clothed with a public character, is intrigue. 
Separate morals from politics, and politics have no longer 
any supjiort, but lose themselves in a bottomless abyss." ' 
Choiseul and Vergennes employed their power without too 
keen an eye to international honor ; used means, to avow 
which would have been insanity ; and, in their dealings 
with England, sunk moral considerations to a fathomless 
depth. 

The treaty of 1763 was a di.sgrace, to be wiped out. 
Choiseul lost no time and took no chances. He laid plans 
to thwart the policy of England in India, in the Mediter- 
ranean, in the Ea.stern islands ; he kept strict watch over the 
diplomacy of Europe. " There was not a single point," 
says the biographer of one of his secret emi.ssaries, " where 
the wary and alert minister had not his agents, spies, and 
instruments for the aggrandizement of France and the 
injury of England."' From time to time, his animosity 
broke out freely in his official correspondence. ' ' We are in 
no haste, as \'ou may well imagine," he wrote in 1767 to a 
member of the embassy at London, " to see a firm ministry 

' Se^ur, Le Politique de Tous les Cabinets de I'Europe, I, p. 119, 
note ; p. 113, note. 

'^ Kapp, Life of Kalb, p. 43. 



4 J''ra>icc and the Atnerira?! Revolution . 

established in Hn^laiid. 1 hope that the anarchy will not 
soon cease. Would that it might last a century." ' A year 
later, he expressed a wish that the popular tumult on behalf 
of Wilkes might increase. " A rumor is abroad here," he 
said, " that on the fifteenth there was a sort of action in the 
city of London, in wdiich many people perished. I dare not 
flatter myself that this report is true. The English never 
destroy one another so fast as we could wish." ' 

That he might the more safely hasten their destruction, 
Choiseul fortified his country by diplomacy. He adhered 
to the sharply criticized Austrian alliance ; chiefly, it is 
said, to secure neutrality on the continent in case of war 
with England, and thus to avoid the disadvantage of a 
double conflict with the navy of Great Britain and the 
armies of her allies.' Before the close of tlie Seven Years' 
War, he had strengthened the natural l)ond between France 
and Spain by the Third Family Compact. This agreement 
assured France of at least one ally in case her minister 
should succeed in bringing on the war which he desired. 
Meanwhile, further negotiation, wcjrking on the easily ex- 
cited jiassions for revenge and acquisition, aroused the 
Spaniard to eagerness for war. Choiseul was "as sure of 
Spain," we are told, " as if he had been the ])rnne minister 
of Charles III." ' 

Choi.seul tried to bring al)()Ut a ruptiu'e with Juigland in 
1765. Three years later he made a second attempt, but his 
colleagues in the Council overruled him. Papers drawn up 
by his order are .still extant, minutely describing the 
Englisli coast, with a view to its facilities for landing an 
army of invasion.' The fact that no u.se was made of this 
information argues prudence on the part of the King and 
his advisers, rather than any sentiment of forbearance 
toward England. Not only the publicly recognized C<)uncil 

' Choiseul to Diiraiul, Aug. 4, 1767. l)e Witt, JefTerson, j). 420. 

'•'Choiseul to du Chatelet, May 23, 176S. Ibid. p. 438. 

^ S^gur, Le Politique de Tous les Cabinets, I, p. 88, note. Cape- 
figue, Louis XVI, II, p. 22. Fla,ssan, Diplomatic Fran9aise, VI, p. 53. 

* Lacretelle, Histoire de PVance, IV, p. 191. 

^ Mahon, History of England from the Peace of Utrecht to the Peace 
of Versailles, V, .\))]ien(lix, ]ip. xix, xxii. 



/'omas/s of Rcvolutio}i. 5 

but llic secret cabinel of Louis X\' were intent on prospects 
of war. A plan for the invasion of Iint>lan(l was the only 
paper spared when the secret correspondence was consigned 
to the flames b}' order of Louis XVL at the opening of his 
reign.' 

At the very time when luigland was adjusting her un- 
•stable peace with France, the British Ministry were pre- 
paring measures that could not fail to embroil them with 
the American Colonies and give France an opportunity for 
mischief. Seven months after the ratification of the treaty 
of 1763, the proper commissioners were instructed to pre- 
pare a bill imposing a stamp duty on the Colonists. This 
bill was laid aside for a year, but in the meantime laws 
were pas.sed to extend the Navigation Acts and modify 
American imposts.' The news of these measures roused in- 
tense excitement in the Provinces. Tidings of tlie discon- 
tent reached France, and Choiseul ])romptly sent his first 
secret agent to America. 

This emissary, sent out in 1764, was 1\L de Pontleroy, a 
lieutenant in the P^rench navy.' On his return to Europe 
in 1766, he made his report to ^L Durand, then chief clerk 
of the iMench embassy in London. The report comprised 
an account of the products, occupations, and industrial and 
military resources of the Provinces, the state of their de- 
fences, the character and the political aspirations of their in- 
habitants. Durand, in forwarding this information to Choi- 
seul, expres.sed the opinion that the Colonies were too oj)U- 
lent, ambitious, and conscious of their strength, to remain 
in obedience, but that a revolution ending in American 
independence would be a disadvantage to I'rance ; because 
the Colonies in question, producing, as they did, all the 
necessaries of life, could absorb at will their southern neigh- 
bors, the producers of sugar, coffee, and cotton. In a word, 
the independence of America would endanger French rule 
in the West Indies. Durand was a conservative. He held 

' Vergennes and du May lo Louis XVI, Feb. (?) 1775; Segur, I^e 
Politique, I, p. 106. 

2 Bancroft, III, pp. 55, 73. 

^ De Witt, JefTcTSf)n, p. 407, note. 



6 France and the Ameriean Revolntio)i . 

to the old policy of war against all the Knglish. He spoke 
of the importance of injuring British conunerce, and advised 
that Pontlero3''s instructions for a second mission be framed 
with that object.' 

Choiseul, reph'ing briefly, put aside Durand's scheme for 
attacking the commerce of h^igland. He said that M. de 
Pontlero}' would i)e instructed, on his second tour through 
the Colonies, simply to verify his former report. "Our 
ideas on America, whether military or political," said he, 
" are infinitely changed within thirty years." ' 

A few months after this discussion, Benjamin Franklin's 
published replies to the Parliamentary intpiiry on the sub- 
ject of the Stamp Act sup])lied the F'rench Ministry with 
another source of information on American affairs. M. 
Durand, who was acting as minister plenipotentiary at this 
time, zealously cultivated P'ranklin's accpiaintance, ques- 
tioning him about America, asking for all his political writ- 
ings, and offering him various social attentions. P^ranklin 
suspected a hidden motive for these civilities. " I fancy," 
he wrote to his son, " that intriguing nation would like very 
well to meddle on occasion, and blow U]1 the coals between 
Great Britain and her Colonies, but I hope we shall give 
them no opportunity." '' 

Durand gathered from Franklin's report, that the opposite 
commercial interests of England and America were tending 
to produce an outbreak of hostilities ; but he thought that 
England, foreseeing the trouble, would take measures to 
ward it off. He believed that the revolution would be 
gradual and would lead, not to a separation of the Colonies 
from the mother country, but to a luiion such as that of 
Scotland with the crown of Great Britain. On this point, 
too, Choiseul was of a different opinion. He thought that 
England could hold her Colonies only by ab.solute control of 
their conunerce ; while, if she tried to luaintain this control 

'Durand to Choiseul, Aug. 3, 7, 20, 22, 24, 1766. De Witt, Jeffer- 
son, pp. 407, 410, 412, 413, 415. 

'Choiseul to Durand, Aug. 11, Se])t. 15, 1766. Ibid. pp. 412, 417. 
^To William Franklin, Aug. 28, 1767. Works, IV, p. 32. 



Fo>ecasfs of Revolution. 7 

by imposts, the Colonics would rebel, and she would be un- 
able to subdue them.' 

Choiseul believed, then, that a revolution in America was 
approach iiii^;. It is clear, from his instructions to his next 
colonial agent, that he did not fear American independence, 
and that he was inclined to aid the Colonies The projected 
second voyage of M. de Pontleroy seems never to have taken 
place; but on the fourth of October, 1767, the Baron de 
Kali), an officer in the French service, who had been secretly 
gathering American news in Holland, set sail for Philadel- 
phia. Choiseul instructed him to iind out what the Ameri- 
can people intended nj do, and what it was advisable to send 
them — for instance, whether the\' recjuired engineers and 
cavalry officers ; — and also to enquire into their facilities for 
procuring munitions and suj^plies, the strength of their de- 
termination to escape from luiglish rule, their militarv 
resources and local advantages, the plan of their revolt, and 
the names of the leaders who would probably take com- 
mand." 

Through the year 1768, during his stay in America and 
after his return, de Kalb made frequent reports. He found 
the country in a ferment. The excitement caused by the 
Stamp Act had hardly had time to die out after the repeal, 
before new taxes caused fresh irritation. The jieople were 
entering into non-importation agreements and setting up 
manufactories for themselves. De Kalb thought that if 
the Colonies had any easy means of comminiication (jr if 
they were united in their interests, they would soon become 
indejKMident. b<ven as it was, this result would come in 
time. \{ not produced by British oppression, it would 
follcjw fr(jm the natural growth of population ; for the 
country was too large to be governed from a distance. But 
the people showed no inclination to call on foreign powers 
for help. In fact, such aid would be an object of greater 
susjMcion to them than the encroachments of England. 

' Durand to Choiseul, Aug. 11, 30, vSept. 3, 1767. Choiseul to 
Durand, Aug. 24. De Witt, Jefferson, pp. 420, 427, 428, 425. 

' Kapp, Life of Kalb, p. 46. Colleville, I<es Missions Secretes, 
p. 20. 



8 Fra)ice and the Americaji Revolution . 

Even if they should ask assistance, de Kalb thouglit it 
would be unwise to grant it until they had declared their 
independence, formed a confederation, invited all nations to 
share their commerce, and established an army and a navy. 
Premature advances, he thought, would only reconcile the 
Colonies to Ivngland and unite the two countries for an 
attack on the I'^rench territories in America.' 

While de Kalb was carrying on his rcsearcht-s abroad and 
making his reports, the discussion at home continued. The 
new ambassador at IvOndon, the Coiuit du Chatelet, showed 
keen interest in American affairs. In March, 176S, evi- 
dently in ignorance of the measures already taken by 
Choiseul, du Chatelet advised him to send agents to America 
to gather information while the peace lasted, and, in case a 
revolution seemed imminent, to form centers of union and 
hope, and suggest an a])peal for foreign aid." In a letter 
written in November, du Ciiatelet discussed the question 
whether a revolution in then^-ar future was probable. The 
Colonists were firm in their refusal to trade with England, 
l)ut many people believed that the mother country would 
give way under the pressure of industrial distress. Du 
Chatelet feared that the British Ministry, realizing how 
hard it would be to subdue the Americans by force, would 
come t(> an accommodation with them and then divert their 
minds from i)ast grievances by operations against France 
and Spain. He deplored the fact that the Bourbon powers 
could not profit by the state of affairs in America ; Init, like 
de Kalb, he feared that any advances would lead the 
Colonists to make peace with England.'' As time passed, 
and there was no sign of change in the British policy, he 
began to doubt whether a reconciliation was probable, and 

' De Kalb to Choiseul, Philadelphia, Jan. 15, 20, 176S; New York, 
Feb 25 (or 21); Boston, March (or May) 2; Philadelphia, Apr. 19; 
Paris (?) Aug. 6; Paris, Sept. 16 (or Oct. 10); Nov. 6, 15. Kapp, 
Life of Kalb, pp. 53-68, passim, and 286 to 295. Colleville, Les 
Missions Secretes, pp. 43-81. De Witt, Jeflerson, pp. 458-464. 

' Du Chatelet to Choiseul, March 12, 1768. De Wilt, Jeflerson, 

P- 433- 

^Du Chatelet to Choiseul, Nov. 11, 18, 176S. Ibid. pp. 445, 448. 



Forecasts of Rcvolntioi. 9 

to fear a premature declaration of war. Ever\'thing de- 
pended on the action of the Ivnghsh Parhatnent, he wrote 
early in December, 1768. If it persisted in taxing the 
Colonies, the revolution would probabh' break out within 
six months. In that case, France would fnid herself face to 
face with two questions : could the union of the Colonies 
maintain itself against the power of England, without the 
support which a foreign war would lend it ; and could 
France and Spain remain idle spectators of the struggle ? 
The two nations would be obliged to decide wdiether they 
would run the risk involved in supporting the revolution, or 
leave it to the chance of dyiug out for want pf sustenance/ 

Choiseul agreed, in the main, with the ambassador's con- 
clusiotis. He thought a revolution certain unless England 
changed her colonial policy." But the veto of his war pro- 
ject, occurring at about this time, probabh' dampened his 
interest in the Provinces. De Kalb was coldly received on 
his return from America. P'or some time, the Minister re- 
fused even to grant him an audience. " It was obvious," 
says de Kalb, "that his system .... had changed, as he 
no longer expressed any desire to know what was pas.sing in 
America."^ " It was he," Lafayette afterwards wrote of 
de Kalb, in words which betray characteristic impatience of 
the minister's seeming apathy, — " It was he whom M. de 
Choiseid sent to visit the English Colonies, and who, on his 
return, obtained money from him, but no audience; so little 
did this minister think of the Revolution, the retrospective 
honor of which .some people have assigned to him."^ 

The time for military interference in America had not yet 
come ; but early in 1769 Choiseul and du Chatelet discussed 
the feasibility of binding the Colonies to France and Spain 
by commercial ties. Du Chatelet originated the plan. A 
bolder design, adapted oid\' to a state of war, had been pro- 
posed to him in a letter of the preceding July, written prob- 

' Du Chatelet to Choiseul, Dec. 9, T76S. De Witt, Jeffersou, p. 449. 
■^Choiseul to du Chatelet, Nov. 22, Dec. 20, 1768. lljid. pp. 449, 

451- 

» Sparks MSS. XXXII, vol. I. 
* Ibid. LXXXVI, p. 3. 



lO France and the American Revolution. 

ably by his chief secretary, M. Frances.' This may have 
suggested to the ambassador his own less venturesome 
scheme. The writer of the letter believed that a com- 
mercial treaty with the Americans would be desirable. 
Such a treaty, he said, could be jM'oposed to them only at 
the moment of a rupture with the mother country and. for 
that reason, ought to be fully discussed in advance. If 
offered at the critical moment, it might detach the Colonies 
from England. France and Spain would then profit by the 
lowering of the British reveimes ; while a stipulation of 
neutrality would free their colonies from the danger of 
being attacked by the Americans in future wars, and would 
naturally develop into a treaty of alliance. 

About six months after the receipt of this letter, we find 
du Chatelet laying before the minister, evidently not for the 
first time, a plan of collusion with the Americans, suited to 
a state of peace." He proposed that France and »Spain 
should relax their connnercial restrictions, even at the risk 
of temporary inconvenience to their own citizens. This 
would encourage trade between Americans .and subjects of 
the King, enable FVenchmen to provide the Colonists with 
those manufactured articles which they had ceased to obtain 
from England, and lead to the formation of commercial 
habits which England, even in case of a reconciliation, 
would find hard to break. Besides this, France would gain 
an indirect advantage. Tlie encouragement to American 
connnerce would inspire the Provincials with a desire for 
independence, while giving them means to carry on the 
struggle for liberty. In this wa\', the embarra.ssment of 
England would be prolonged. Du Chatelet saw, as his cor- 
respondent of the preceding July had not seen, that, as a 
counterpoi.se to these gains, the risk to French and Spanish 
possessions from enterprising Americans might be increa.sed 
rather than diminished by helping them to independence. 

' De Witt assigns the letter to M. Frances, (Jefferson, p. 440 ;) Ban- 
croft, to Choiseul, (III, p. 294.) The request for instructions, and the 
writer's ignorance of the date at which the treaty with Holland would 
expire, point to the clerk rather than the minister. 

■^ Du Chatelet to Choiseul, Jan. 28, 1769. De Witt, Jefferson, p. 451, 



Forecasts of Revolniion. ii 

France and Spain " must reflect," lie said, " whether it is 
to their interest to second this revolution at the risk of the 
consequences which might result from it later for the whole 
new world, and whether the enfeeblement of the common 
enemy can compensate the risk to which such an example 
would expose them, from their own Colonies." But the 
danger was remote, and less impressive than the present 
advatitage. 

This i)lan was wholly at variance with the conservative 
policy of the Bourbons ; yet Choiseul recommended it to the 
Council, all the members present approved of it, and it was 
sent by the King's order to the Court of Spain.' Here, it 
met with serious opposition. Spain feared that such con- 
cessions would lead to contraband trade with her colonies 
and to illicit extraction of gold and silver from their mines. 
She feared, too, that a republican neighbor would indulge 
in schemes of con(juest at her expense. Choiseul was 
obliged to drop the project for a time, to give the vSpanish 
Court leisure for reflection.'' He never had an opportunity 
to resume it, for he was deprived of his ofhce in 1770. The 
too independent zeal with which he showed his enmity 
toward Ivigland was one of the causes of his downfall. He 
was plotting with Spain at this time, for a war against the 
common foe ; and it is said that he insj)ired the Spanish 
attack on the British settlement of Port Egmont, in the 
Falkland Islands. His i^ersonal enemies informed King 
Louis of his secret activity, and the monarch promptly 
ended his public career b}' a decree of exile. ^ 

The Duke d'Aiguillon, who succeeded Choiseul, reversed 
his foreign policy. In order to oppose the combined 
powers, Prussia, Russia, and Austria, whose influence in 
European politics was growing at the expense of P'rance, 
■d'Aiguillon cultivated friendly relations with luigland/ Of 

' Choiseul to du Chatelet, Feb. 6, 1769. De Witt, Jefferson, p. 454. 

^ D'Ossun to Choiseul, Feb. 20, 1769. Choiseul to du Chatelet, ilarch 
14. Ibid. pp. 455, 457. 

'^ Lacretelle, Histoire de France, IV, pp. 243, 255. 

*Flassan, Diplomatic Fran^aise, VII, p. 45. Soulavie, IMenioires, 
III, p. 340. 



j2 France and the American Revolution. 

„,,, „, u,e <^r<^lX^::^, , 'ortltsLn^r Act, 
"" r^VJ^.H^e of Ur>ortu„ity which Choisenl had 
Z^ ad CO c:;:u,: a frie, 'uv aUiance . i.h the A„,erica„s. 



11. 

AID FOR AMERICA. 



The Council appointed by Louis X\'I on his accession to 
the throne, was not of a character to raise expectations 
of a vigorous foreign i:)olicy. The King liimself, without 
whose consent no important stej) could be taken, desired 
peace even with England. Burdened with a conscience, an 
awkward encumbrance under the circumstances, he had 
scruples against breaking a treaty without sufficient cause. 
His prime minister, the Count de Maurepas, was an aged 
courtier who, after suffering a long exile, had returned to 
the pleasures of the court with a desire to enjo}- them un- 
disturbed. To the pursuit of this end, he brought political 
skill and incredible lightness (;f mind, "capable," said a 
member of his Cabinet, "of sacrificing great interests to a 
witticism."' It could be foretold that he would not 
willingly make himself responsible for another war with 
England. Soon after his appointment, Turgot, the econo- 
mist, became minister of finance. Finance ministers do 
not love war, nor do economists. Turgot's voice might 
safel}' be counted on the side of peace. 

The policy of the Count de Vergennes, who, as head of 
the department of Foreign Affairs, would probably have 
more influence for peace or war than any other man, was 
less easy to predict. Vergennes had already made a reputa- 
tion in diplomacy ; but his name was not, like those of 
Choiseul and d'Aiguillon, connected with any special sys- 
tem, Austrian or English. Without binding himself to any 
theory, he had employed his skill in dealing with each 
problem as it arose. Yet the general direction of his course 
might perhaps be foreseen from certain facts of his past 
career. Connected since 1755 with the secret diplomatic 
service of Louis X\','' he had been trained in hostilit}' toward 

' St. Germain ; quoted by Soulavie, III, p. 170. 
^ Segur, Le Politique, I, p. 97. 



14 France and the Americaii Revolutio7i. 

Great Britain ; and when the secret correspondence was 
burned, he had pleaded for leave to preserve a plan for the 
debarkation of troops in England. 

During the three and a half years sin^e the downfall (A 
Choiseul, the dispute between the Americans and the 
mother country had reached a crisis. The Colonies were 
uniting. Regular communication had been established be- 
tween them through conunittees of C(jrres[)ondence ; and 
now, in response to the series of harsh measures by which 
the British Parliament expressed its disapproval of the 
Boston tea party, the Provinces were electing delegates to a 
Continental Congress. The lack of means of communica- 
tion and the absence of any common interest, conditions 
which de Kalb had noted as obstacles to union, were being 
overcome ; and the .same changes which were preparing the 
Colonies to unite against England, were making it possible 
for them to welcome foreign intervention. 

Vergennes moved cautiously. He received reports of the 
situation from Gamier, the charge d'affaires! \n London, but 
at first showed no desire to interfere in the quarrel. Merely 
as a quarrel, whatever its outc(jme, it was to the interest of 
France ; for it occupied England, and kept her from troub- 
ling her neighbors. This was an advantage ; for, however 
busily France might plot against England, she did not at this 
time desire open war. \'crgennes regarded the American 
conflict as " the surest guaranty of the pacific sentiments of 
His Britannic Majesty and of his ministers." vSome guar- 
anty, he believed, was needed ; for he had no confidence in 
the peace policy of England. "Let us not deceive our- 
.selves in this," said he: "whatever parade the F^nglish 
ministry make of their pacific intentions, we can count on 
this disposition onh' so long as their domestic embarrass- 
ments last." ' 

Vergennes, like man}' other observers on both sides of the 
Channel, at first considered the American Revolution the 
work of the Opposition party in lingland. " If the King of 
England governs his Parliament at will, the Opposition 

'Vergennes to Garnier, Sept. ii, 1774. Mhnoire by Vergennes,, 
Dec. 8. Doniol, I, pp. 13, 19. 



Aid for America. 15 

governs the Colonies uo less abselutely. " ' Almost np to 
the date of I^exington, he believed that the interests (^f com- 
merce and industry would force an acconnnodation. Yet he 
was always on the alert ; and it was [Mobably with his 
approval that Garnier, conx'ersing with Franklin just before 
his departure from London, several weeks prior to the out- 
break of the war, significantly reminded him of the aid 
which France had given the United Provinces in their 
struggle against vSpain.' 

When war had begun, Vergennes was quick to see the 
trend of events. Even if the grievances of America had 
been at first, as he suspected, a mere pretext for the quarrel, 
the Colonists when once aroused could not be restrained 
from going beyond the designs of their political abettors in 
England, and seeking independence. Owing to the nature 
of the country and the distribution of the population, he 
thought that England would be unable to reduce the Colo- 
nies by force of arms. The success of a negotiation seemed 
extremely doubtful, but he believed that England would try 
this way of adjusting the dif^culties. Only when he heard 
of the British King's proclamation of August, 1775, declar- 
ing the Americans rebels, was he convinced that England 
had cut herself off from all hope of bringing the contest to 
a peaceful close.'' 

Before England had taken this decisive step, the war 
alarm sounded in the French Cabinet. In July, 1775, the 
Count de Guines, ambassador at London, reported a conver- 
sation in which Lord Rochford had said that some of the 
members of both political parties were advocating war 
against France as the surest way to stop the American con- 
flict.' Ever since the time of the vStamp Act. the French 
authorities had feared that England would have recour.se to 
a vigorous foreign policy in order to end her domestic 
troubles. Now the British foreign .secretary, with singular 

' Vergennes to de Guines, July i, 1775. Doniol, I, p. S^. 
Tarton, Life of Franklin, II, p. 67. 

^Vergennes to Garnier, Jan. 15, 1775. To de Guines, July 10, 29; 
Aug. 20, 27 ; Sept. 3. Doniol, I, pp. 68, 90, 95, 171, 172, 174. 
^ De Guines to Vergennes, July 28, 1775. Ibid. I, p. 116. 



i6 Frmuc- iind the American Revolution . 

indiscretion, contributed his word of warning. The hint 
threw France o\\ her guard. \'ergennes sent the substance 
of de Gnines' dispatch to the ambassador in Spain, and rec- 
ommended a plan of defense. At the first act of open hos- 
tihty on the part of England, let France and Spain seize as 
man\- of her ships as po.ssible. They might, however, ex- 
empt the vessels of the North American Colonists ; for it 
would be impolitic to make tliem regret tlieir war with Eng- 
land, and to force them back under the yoke. Circnm- 
stances might arise in which it would be advisable to treat 
them as an independent ]ieople, invite them to visit French 
and Spanish ports, and offer them freedom of connnerce.' 

Some time before this, de Gnines had complained that he 
could not obtain reliable American news in England, and 
had suggested the advantage of having an agent in America. 
For this mission he had recommended M. de Bonvouloir, a 
French officer who had visited all the British colonies in 
America, and who desired an opportunity to return. \'er- 
geunes, with the King's approval, now authorized de Guines 
to send the man. His journey and correspondence were so 
arranged that the Ministry could not be compromised. His 
two chief duties were, to report the course of events and the 
developments of opinion in America, and to teach the peo- 
ple that they had no reason to fear the PVench. His first 
instructions, which contained a word of reassurance for the 
Americans on independence, the dcstin\- of Canada, and 
commercial facilities in French ports, were considerably 
modified before he sailed. De Guines heard that the insur- 
gents were proclaiming their hopes of aid from France and 
Spain; and, taking alarm, he forbade his emissary "even 
to pronounce the word French," and left him nothing to do 
but watch and report the progress of affairs.' Bonvouloir, 
as we shall see, ignored this prohibition ; and it is hard to 
decide whether \'ergennes was more pleased or offended by 
his indiscretion. 

' Vergennes to d'Ossun, Aug. 7, 1775. Doniol, I, pp. 123-7. 

-De Guines to Vergennes, July r, 28, 1775. Vergennes to de Guines, 
Aug. 7. Doniol, I, pp. 154, 155. De Guines to Vergennes, Sept. S. De 
Wilt, JefFer.son, p. 475. 



Aid for A //I erica . 1 7 

Boiivouloir sailed early in vSeptcinher, 1775, arrived at 
Philadelphia in December, and was cordially received. A 
change ot" sentiment had gradually taken ])laee in the 
Colonies since the days of Choiseul, when iManklin met the 
advances of the iM'eiich andjassador with suspicion, and 
when de Kalh became convinced that the Americans would 
repel all f(;reign interference. Although the Colonists 
fought during the first year for redress of grievances and 
not for independence, there were a few radicals who saw 
from the beginning that inde])endence would be the natural 
outcome of the contest, and that this result might be 
hastened by foreign alliances. In 1774, Patrick Henry pre- 
dicted an alliance with Fraiice, Spain, and Holland.' At the 
opening of the Congress of 1775, vSrnnuel and John Adams 
were convinced that an immediate declaration was necessary. 
Independence first, .said John Adams ; then a last attem])t to 
treat with luigland ; and in case of failure, overtures to 
foreign countries. ]^>ut the conservatives carried the day, 
and a la.st petition was sent to the King. Convinced of its 
uselessness, Adams persisted in urging almost daily a 
declaration of independence and the adoption of a plan of 
treaties to be offered to foreign powers, especially France 
and Spain. In the fall of 1775, probably late in September, 
Mr. Chase of Maryland moved to send ambassadors to 
France. The effect of this motion on the nerves of Con- 
gress, says Mr. Adams, was galvanic. " The grimaces, the 
agitations and convulsions were very great." In the argu- 
ment which followed, many substitutes for the motion were 
offered, and there were " twenty subtle projects to get rid of 
it." The debate ended, on the twenty-ninth of November, 
in a compromise measure : the f(jrmation of a connnittee to 
correspond with friends "in Great liritain, Ireland, and 
other parts of the world." '^ 

A fortnight after the Committee of Secret Correspondence 
was formed, it .sent a letter to Dr. Arthur Lee, P'ranklin's 
successor in the agency for Massachusetts in London, direct- 

'Parlon's Franklin, II, jj. iii. 

^ Life and Works of John Adams, II, pp. 406 ff. ; I, pp. 200-3; 
II, pp. 503-6. Secret Journals of Congress, II, p. 5. 
2 



1 8 Fra)icc ajid tlie American Revolutioji. 

ing him to find out the disposition of foreign powers toward 
the Colonies. A week later Franklin wrote in the name of 
the Committee, to his friend Charles Dumas, a Swiss resi- 
dent of Holland, requesting him to take advantage of his 
situation at The Hague to find out whether any of the 
European states would prolnd^ly be willing to assist the 
Colonies or enter i'.ito an alliance with them. Dumas wa.s 
empowered to confer with ministers of state, using Frank- 
lin's letter as a credential and taking precautions for keep- 
ing the matter from the ears of the Ivnglish ambassador.' 

At this critical time the French agent, Bonvouloir, ap- 
peared in Philadelphia. Making Dr. Franklin's acquaint- 
ance, he obtained several hearings from the Committee of 
Secret Correspondence. The substance of these interviews 
may be gathered from his report to de Guines." He made 
.some indefinite offers of service, and was asked how France 
regarded the Colonies. He answered : he believed that 
France wislied ilieni 'cvell. Would she aid them ? Perhaps 
so. On what footing ? He knew nothing about it ; but if 
she should do .so, it would always be on just and equitable 
terms. Would it be prudent to send a " deputy plenipoten- 
tiary " to France ? He thought it would be precipitate, even 
hazardous. Yet lie would not advise them in any way. He 
was a private individual, a curious traveller ; but he would 
be charmed to serve them through his acquaintances. When 
the committee broached the subject of a treaty, Bonvouloir 
refused to indicate the terms that France might be induced 
to grant ; but he argued that France was more eligible as an 
ally than Spain. In consequence of these interviews, he 
received from the committee a written request for French 
engineers, leave to procure arms and annnunition in France, 
and the privilege of entry into French ports. He replied, 
also in writing, giving some encouragement as to engineers 
and munitions, but speaking with hesitation about commer- 
cial privileges. 

While one Frenchman was telling Congress that help 

' l-"raiiklin cl al . to Arthur Lee, Dec. 12, 1775. Franklin to Dumas, 
Dec. 19. Diplomatic Correspondence, II, pp. 63, 65. 
' De Witt, Jefferson, pp. 47S ff. 



Aid /oi' .Inierica. 19 

might be obtained in France, another was trying to persuade 
King L,ouis to grant it. The political and mercantile ven- 
ture of Caron Beaumarcliais, courtier, man of letters, and 
agent in the secret service, — his trials and achievements on 
behalf of America — form one of the most romantic episodes 
of the Revolution. Beaumarcliais was in London in 1775, 
collecting news of American affairs and spying on the British 
Ministry. His sources of information were varied. He was 
on friendly terms with Lord Rochford, the English Secretary 
for Foreign Affairs, and also with Wilkes, the most notori- 
ous leader of the Opposition ; he had dealings with Arthur 
Lee, the agent for Massachusetts ; and he frequently met 
travellers from America. Reporting his impressions to 
King Louis, he repeatedly urged him, for the safety and 
glory of France, to aid the American insurgents. In case 
the King decided to grant them money, the breach of neu- 
trality might be hidden by conveying the favors through a 
fictitious mercantile company. Beaumarcliais expressed his 
willingness to personate this firm.' The King objected to 
the plan, on the ground of justice to England. Beaumar- 
cliais, in a long reply," tried to reconcile his project with the 
"delicate conscientiousness" of the King. "The policy 
which maintains nations," he argued, "differs almost en- 
tirely from the moral law which governs individuals 

The masterpiece of sound policy is to ba.se your tranquillity 
on the divisions of your enemies." With unscrupulous 
plausibility, he argued that no treaty with the English mon- 
arch could justly re.strain the King of France ; for it was the 
English people who desired war, and they would always 
compel their King to yield. The conscience of Louis was 
not entirely satisfied with this logic, for we hear that he con- 
tinued to protest ; but pressure, official and unofficial, forced 
him to give way.'^ 

For some time the Americans had been obtaining aid from 
citizens of France by the channels of commerce. The reports 
of English spies showed the existence of an active trade in 

* Deane Papers, I, p. no. 

^Durand, New Materials, pp. 59, 68, 69. 

•^Soulavie, Memoires, III, pp. 346-8. 



20 Fra)icc and the American Revolution. 

arms and ammunition. The British Ministry, believing that 
the government connived at it, repeatedly called attention to 
the subject through their embassy. \'ergennes protested 
innocence, saying that military stores could not be shipped 
from France without special orders, and thai the govern- 
ment did not lend such countenance to men who were aiding 
the in.surgents. He would not vouch for all the acts of un- 
ruly individuals, but whatever the Ministry could prevent 
should be j^revented. England's trouble with her Colonies, 
he declared, was to nobody's interest ; the consecpiences of 
it were as obvious as those of the cession of Canada. The 
Count de Maurepas added his professions of friendsliip. 
" Be sure," said he, " that we are not people who seek to 
take unfair advantage of circumstances, and to fish in 
troubled waters." He even hinted that the Americans had 
forfeited the sympathy of the French in aiming at indepen- 
dence. By their united efforts the two ministers convinced 
the suspicious ambassador, Lord Stormont, that France was 
desirous of peace. ' 

It was probably not far from the time of these friendly 
professions that Vergeinies' secretary, Gerard de Rayneval, 
drew up an elaborate memorial discussing the interest of 
France in the affairs of the American Colonies." His argu- 
ment was based on suggestions which different persons had 
made to Vcrgennes, some at his request, others of their own 
initiative.^ The writer traces the development of the quarrel 
between England and her Colonies in a manner which shows 
his sympathy with the Americans. Inquiring whether 
France ought to desire the independence of America, he an- 
swers that the benefit to France can be measured by the 
injury to Ivngland. Three specific advantages will be 
gained : a diminution of English power and an increase of 
French ; loss to linglish and gain to French trade ; and a 
chance to recover part of the French j)ossessions in America. 
To those who fear that the iVmericans will try to encroach 

'St. Paul to Rochford, Sept. 20, 1775. Stormont to Rochford, Ocl. 
31. Stevens Facsimiles, 1303, 1306. 
"^Reflexions: qy. end of 1775. Ibid. 13 10. 
^Doniol I, p. 242. 



Aid for .1 III erica. 21 

on the French and vSpanish territories, lie sa_\'s lliat the peo- 
ple will be too ninch exhausted bv the war to think of con- 
ciuest. This fear "deserves no consideration." But it does 
not follow that it is best to aid thcni at once. It would be 
well to wait and see whether Ivn^land can conquer them in 
another campaign. If she is not strong enough for this, 
France ma}' safely interfere. Meanwhile, let her sup])ort 
the courage of the Americans and flatter them with the hope 
of assistance. In this way she will avoid compromising her- 
self either with the insurgents or with the F^nglish Court. 
The animus with which this counsel is given is even more 
significant than its substance. " Ivngland is the natural 
enemy of France," — st) reads this official document, — " and 
she is a ra[)acious, unjust, and faithless enemy. The invari- 
able object of her policy is, if not the destruction, at least the 
al)asement of France. This is always the real motive of the 
wars wliich she has stirred up against her, and this State 
leason always prevails over any other consideration ; and 
when it speaks, all means are lawful, provided they be effi- 
cacious. This dis])osition, known to all the universe, dis- 
charges France from the obligations which the right of 
nations has established between countries, and authorizes her 
to make use of reprisals in order to weaken an enemy who 
is constantly seeking to injure hei." 

While the American question was under consideration in 
the fiM'eign office, Beaumarchai.^- was urging the government 
to adopt a decided course. On the last day of February, 
1776, he addressed to the King a memorial,' written to prove 
the necessity of assisting the Americans, as a measure of 
self-defense. Whether lingland obtained peace with her 
Colonies by victory, defeat, or reconciliation, war between 
France and England was sure to follow. The onl}' way, 
then, {or France to maintain peace was to keep the Ameri- 
can conflict alive. At nearly the .same time with Beau- 
marchais' memorial, the government received Bonvouloir's 
report,^ containing an assurance that the Americans would 
welcome the co-operation of France. The arguments of 

' Peace or War. Beauniarchais and hi.s Times, III, p. 117. 
^De Witt, Jefferson, p. 478, note. 



22 France and the American Revolution . 

these amateur dipUMiiatists were reinforced by urgent mes- 
sages from the Court of Spain. Bound to France b}' an 
alHance offensive and defensive, bound to her still more 
closely by common hatred of hhigland, vS])ain was as ready 
for mischief as her ally, and far more eager for gain. At 
this period, her ambition pointed toward the con(iuest of 
Portugal, with whom rival interests in America had brought 
her into conflict. France had declared her unwillingness to 
risk a continental war by attacking Portugal in Europe, and 
bad tried to dissuade Spain from a course which would rouse 
F^nglaud to hostility and divert her from the American war 
so advantageous to the Bourbon i)owers. But when the 
aggressions of Portugal, prolonged beyond reason, suggested 
the connivance of England, Spain availed her.self of this 
opportiuiity to persuade P'rance that their old enemy was 
preparing for an attack, and that counter-measures were 
needed. " His Majesty understands," wrote Grimaldi, the 
prime minister of vSpain, "that it is necessary before all 
else to decide whether or no we ought to prepare for 
war, .... whether, calndy rel\ing on our good faith and 
our uj)right intentions, we ought to wait until England her- 
self .... strikes a blow at our ]-)Ossessions or those of 
F'^rance in such a way that afterwards it ma>' be almost im- 
possible to recover them." ' 

Yergennes, though averse to prematiu'e aggressive mea.s- 
ures, was keenly alive to a threatened danger. Unwilling 
to go to the extreme which vSpain desired, he chose a course 
that would leave P'rance uncommitted for the present, but 
able at any moment to strike at Englantl or, better still, to 
provoke P^ngland into dealing the first blow. On the 
twelfth of March, with the approval of the King — won with 
difhculty, as we have .seen, by Beaumarchais' arguments — 
he submitted his plan to his colleagues in the Council. 
Rayneval's manoire had asserted that PVance was interested 
in favoring the insurgents, and that the previous conduct of 
F^ngland would justify such a policy. Vergennes went 
farther. Like Beaumarchais, he claimed that this cour.se 

' Grimaldi to d'Aranda, Feb. 26, 1776. Doniol, I, p. 336. See other 
documents in chapters IX and X. 



Aid for America. 23 

was dictated by political necessity. Whatever tlie outcome 
of the American contest, war between France and Kngland 
might result. In case of reconciliation, Kngland might be 
tempted .to use against France the troo|)S set free in America, 
or the English King might wish to build up arbitrary power 
at home by the aid of a foreign war. In case of defeat, the 
ministers would have recourse to such a war, to save their 
official heads. On the other side was the risk that the 
Colonies might encroach on their neighbors ; but \'ergennes 
gave this danger only passing mention, and returned to less 
remote po.ssibilities. If the two Kings did not ])refer peace, 
he said, this woidd be the time to strike a blow at England, 
place her in the rank of secondary powers, and " deliver the 
universe from a rapacious tyrant." In any case, it was de- 
sirable that the i'>re,sent war should last a year, to keep the 
British forces in America, to prevent a change in the British 
Mini.stry, to weaken the British army, and to give France 
and Spain time for j^reparation. To ensure this, they mu.st 
convince the English of their friendship, and at the same 
time encourage the Americans with vague hopes. "Con- 
tinue to feed dexterously the security of the English Min- 
istry as to the intentions of France and Spain ; " aid the in- 
surgents with money and munitions, but enter into no 
alliance with them ; above all, increase the forces of France 
and Spain, and prepare for defense : — this was the sum of 
Vergennes' advice.' 

This memorial drew from Tmgot a re])ly '"' remarkable 
for its deviation from the political and economic views of 
the time. The prevailing belief was that a country reaped 
benefit from its colonies only so long as it monopolized their 
trade, and that it could secure this a.scendancy only by force. 
The aim of the pro- American party in France, as we find it 
expressed in many writings of the period, was, b}' severing 
the political tie which bound the Colonies to England, to 
deprive her of the prestige and also of the commercial ])ros- 
perity which she owed to that connection, and thus to bring 

' Stevens Facsimiles, 13 16. 
■^ Oeuvres, II, p. 551. 



24 FriDice (Did the Anieriia>i Revolution . 

about her ruin.' Turgot, while predicting wide-spread 
results from the success of the American re\'olt, threw 
doubt on its efficacy as a means for the abasement of 
England. He said that if the British Provinces became in- 
dependent, the colonies of all the otlitr luiropean nations 
would demand conimeicial freedom and, if denied it, would 
fight for it until they, too, acquired independence. But he 
maintained that the loss of all the colonies would affect the 
prcsperity of the European nations but little, becau.se 
only a very small part of the connnercial beuelit derived 
from colonies was due to restrictions on trade. In view of 
the coming revolution, he advi.sed that France should make 
concessions to her own colonies and thus secure them as 
friends and allies, instead of waiting to see them become 
enemies ; and that she should urge Spain to take the same 
precautions. 

Turgot saw no reason to fear an attack from England ex- 
cept in case ai reconciliation with her Colonies. As minister 
of finance, he objected to beginning a war with army and 
navy only half prepared and with a yearly deficit of twenty 
million livres. Besides, he feared that an attack on 
England would be the signal for an accomuiodation with her 
Colonies. Aid to the Americans, he thought, should not 
transgress the bounds of .strict neutrality. French citizens 
might trade with the insurgents, because the government 
had no reason to discriminate between them and other 
British subjects ; but to supply them with money would be 
a step difficult to conceal, and in case of exposure, would 
incur the just resentment of lingiand. 

Vergennes' vicmoire, attacked in part by Turgot, was 
adopted by the majority of the Council, approved by the King, 
and submitted to the Court of Spain. The Spanish King had 
already expressed his willingness to share the expense of 
aiding the Americans, in order to prolong the revolt and 
allow ICngland and the Colonies to exhaust one another.^ 
He thought, with \'ergennes, that the two Courts were in- 
terested in prolonging the struggle ; that the Colonists, if 

' p-iske, American Revohition, II, pp. 5-6, 131-2. 

' Letter of Grimaldi, March 14, 1776. Doniol, I, 371. 



Aid for America. 25 

not aided, would probably soon succmnb ; and that, while 
it was best not to make common cause with them, it would 
be well to furnish them with what they needed.' 

In the meantime, the commercial facilities granted to 
American traders in French ports continued to arouse indig- 
nation in England. Vergennes had more than once issued 
orders forbidding the exportation of arms by Americans ; 
but they were sham orders, and the practice continued. In 
April, 1776, the English discovered through the treacherous 
mate of an xVmerican ship, that several vessels from the 
Colonies, consigned to merchants of Nantes, were on their 
way to France to procure arms and ammunition. Beau- 
marchais, then in London, was questioned by Lord Roch- 
ford, and answered with all the nonchalance of an irrespon- 
sible private citizen : " Why would you wish our adminis- 
tration to take proceedings against the Nantes merchants ? 
Are we at war with anyone? . . . are not our ports open to 
all the merchants in the world ? . . . On account of a 
quarrel special to England, and in which we do not, nor do 
we want to, take part, has England the right to restrict our 
commerce?" "But, Sir," Lord Rochford answered, "the 
Americans are rebels and are declared enemies!" "My 
Lord, they are not ours. . . . Who prevents you from tak- 
ing measures again.st them ? Cruise on all sides, seize them 
everywhere ; except under the cannon of our forts, how- 
ever ; we have nothing to do with it." Vergennes, forced 
by his official position to be more complaisant, ordered that 
the vessels should not be allowed to take powder and arms 
on board ; but he conveyed to Beaumarchais the Knig's 
approval of his reply to Lord Rochford. Powder and arms 
were objects of commerce, he said ; and it was out of friend- 
ship for England that the King had forbidden their exporta- 
tion. Lord Rochford's tone implied that France was bound 
to make England's interest her own. "I do not know of 
this agreement," said Vergennes ; and, calling to mind the 
aid which England had given to the C(jrsicans in their 
recent .struggle against France, he added: "It does not 

' D'Ossun to Vergennes, Apr. i, 1776. Doniol, I, p. 341. 



26 France a)id the American Revolution. 

exist ill the exrun])le which England gave us at the time 
when she thonglit she could injure us." ' 

Dissatisfied with Vergeiines' assunijition of neutrality, 
Beautnarchais urged him to lend the insurgents one or two 
million livres, and thus gather all the fruits of victory with- 
out a battle. Vergennes began his rejily by contrasting the 
respon.sibilities of practical statesmen like himself with the 
freedom of theorists like Beaumarchais, but concluded by 
assuring him that his advice was not necessarily rejected 
because not seized with avidity : " Consider the matter well, 
and you will find me nearer to you than you thnik." " You 
were certainl}' near me," replied Beaumarchais, quick to 
take the hint, " when I thought you far away." His confi- 
dence was justified. On the very day of the reassuring 
letter, Vergennes submitted to the King for his signature an 
order for a million livres, to be used in aiding the English 
Colonies." The conduct of the enterprise was entrusted to 
Beaumarchais, who assumed, for the .sake of concealment, 
the style of a commercial firm, — Rodrique Hortalez and 
Company. 

During the next few weeks, between the deci.sion of the 
Cabinet and the completion of Beaumarchais' plans, an agent 
of the Americans, without proper credentials but with a 
goodly supply of zeal, was laboring on behalf of his coun- 
trymen and receiving some encouragement from the Minis- 
try. Dr. Barbeu Dubourg, a friend of Franklin, had been 
entrusted by an agent of the Committee of vSecret Corre- 
spondence with the charge of American interests at Paris 
and Versailles. Having learned in conversation with the 
ministers and their friends, that they were devising means 
of aiding the insurgents, he tried to procure a supply of 
ammunition, liy official coiniivance, he was allowed to bor- 
row muskets and cannon from the King's arsenals, for sale 

^Beaumarchais to Vergennes, Apr. i6, 1776. St. Paul to Wey- 
mouth, Apr. 17. Vergennes to Beaumarchais, Apr. 26. Stevens 
Facsimiles, 1322, 1324, 1330. 

^Beaumarchais to Vergennes, Apr. 26, May 11, 1776. Vergennes to 
Beaumarchais, May 2. Ibid. 1328, 1334, 861. Diplomatic Corre- 
.spondence, II, p. 89. 



Aid for America. 27 

to the Americans. Kiiowiiij; that the American arm}' 
needed engineers, Dnbonrg tried to procure them. He also 
"ventured promises" to one or two officers of artiller>-, 
though he doubted the wisdom of employing foreign officers. 
" I believe this is what you have the least need of," he wrote 
to Franklin, "as it may disgust your valiant countrymen." 
He set on foot arrangements with the Farmers General for 
the reception of American tt)bacco, and obtained a promise 
from the Minister of the Navy that his department would 
purchase supplies from America. He reported that the 
Ministry in general seemed to be favorably disposed toward 
the insurgents, but were not inclined to assume any respon- 
sibility for their fortunes. Indeed, these gentlemen were 
much absorbed in their own concerns. Turgot had just 
received his dismissal, " and all the others," wrote Dubourg, 
" are so teased at this time by the extraordinary cabals of 
the court," that no one wishes to go outside his own imme- 
diate department.' 

The change in the ministry of finance did not, of course, 
affect the decision already reached with regard to the insur- 
gents. On the tenth of June, Beaumarchais received a mil- 
lion livres from the treasury, and he began without delay to 
collect supplies for shij)ment to America. 

It is natural to ask, while considering the first acts of 
France in support of the American cause, whether her plea of 
self-defense was genuine, or whether she was influenced 
wholly by a wish to humiliate her rival. Vergennes, in his 
mcmoire of March 12, gave prominence to the aggressive 
motive, — the desire to strike a blow at England and restore 
the former glory of France. As we see him, ostensibly in 
fear of British designs, draw gradually nearer to an alliance 
with America, the suspicion recurs again and again that he 
saw danger ahead becau.se he wished to see it, and that his 
eye for peril grew keener as France became better prepared 
for defense. But this suspicion is misleading. No one who 
reads the letters that passed between the French and Span- 

' Dubourg to Frauklin, June 12-July 2, 1776. Sparks MSS. LII, vol. 
I, p. I. Stevens Facsimiles, 566, 567, 568, 570, S84. Diplomatic Cor- 
respondence, II, p. 113. 



28 France and the Anicrican Rcvohiiion . 

ish Courts during the earl}' years of the Revolution can fail' 
to see that they were watching England as men watch some 
dangerous animal crouching for a spring. Ivvery increase 
in the British naval forces, every movement of a British 
fleet, was jealously noted. Spain, especially, was uncom- 
fortably conscious that her own colonies were near the 
revolted Provinces, and that the destination of an English 
fleet need be changed but little to menace her possessions, 
luirly in 1776 she had special cruisers on the American coast 
to watch the movements of British ships, and was urging 
France to co-operate with lier in the defense of her colonies.' 

Though considerations of safety set the pace of the Bour- 
bon Courts from week to week, as they made haste to antici- 
pate a dreaded attack or held back from provoking an 
encounter for which they were not quite prepared, we can- 
not doubt that, without regard to the intentions of England, 
they desired war, provided they might have it in their owiv 
good time. They were eager to wipe out the treaty of 1763, 
and to regain their lost prestige. Very early in the discus- 
sion, Spain freely hinted her desire for territorial acquisi- 
tions. With France, the chief ambition was to humiliate 
England and destroy her influence among nations. Ver- 
gennes has left a clear .statement of his owmi leading motive,, 
and of the means which he intended to employ. x\ memo- 
rial written by him at the end of his career, contains the 
following passage : "A nation may experience reverses- 
and may yield to the imperious law of necessity and of her 
own preservation ; but when these rever.ses and the humilia- 
tion which has resulted from them are unjust, when they 
have had for their principle and their end the pride of an 
influential rival, she ought, for her honor, her dign.ity, and 
her reputation, to recover herself whenever she finds the 
opportunity. If she neglects it, if fear overpowers duty,, 
she adds abasement to humiliation ; she becomes the object 
of .scorn of her century and of future races. 

"These important truths, Sire, have never left my 
thoughts. They were already deeply graven in my heart 

' Grimaldi to d'Aranda, Feb. 26, 1776. D'Ossuii to Vergennes, Apr. 
29. Doniol, I, 333, 350. 



Aid /or America. 29 

when Your Majesty suinmoned me to your Council ; and I 
waited with lively ini])atience an opportunity to follow their 
impulse. It was these truths that fixed my attention on the 
Americans, that caused me to watch for and to seize the 
moment when Your Majesty could assist this oppressed 
nation with the well-founded hope of effecting their deliver- 
ance. If I had held other sentiments, Sire, other principles, 
other views, I should have betrayed your confidence and 
the interests of the State ; I should regard myself as 
unworthy to serve Your Majesty ; I should regard myself 
as tinworthy to bear the name of Frenchman." ' 

' Doniol, I, p. 3. 



Ill 

TH]<: BKGINNING OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS. 



We have seen that the Cotninittee of vSecret Correspond- 
ence wrote in December, 1775, to Arthnr Lee and Charles 
Dnnias, requesting them to find out whether any of the 
Ivuropean powers were willing to assist the Americans. 
Lee held several interviews with the L^'ench ambassador at 
London, and indirectly heard from him that aid would- 
be furnished to the Colonies. Dumas obtained an inter- 
view with the French minister at The Hague,' and 
enquired whether the King of France would offer his- 
mediation to end the war ; and, in case of failure to reach 
an agreement, whether France and vSpain would form an 
alliance with the Colonies. He received the impression 
that the minister was pleased with the idea of mediation 
and would not have objected to a treaty except for the 
danger of a F^uropean war. But a few weeks later the same 
official told Dumas that the King could not mediate while 
the Colonies were subject to Great Britain, nor ally himself 
with them nor furnish them aids while he was at peace with 
lingland. " The King is a true knight," said the minister ; 
" his word is sacred." But he promised that strict neu- 
trality should be maintained, and that the Aniericans should 
have the same right as " all the other linglish," to export 
merchandise, arms, and munitions of war from France.'' 

Early in March, 1776, while FVanklin's letter was on its 
way to Dumas, the Committee of Secret Correspondence 
appointed Silas Deane, an ex-member of Congress and of the 
Secret Committee for procuring supplies, commercial agent 
to France, giving him at the same time an important political 

' Dumas lo Franklin, Apr. 30, 1776. Diplomatic Correspondence, 
II. p. 86. 

' Dnmas to Committee of Secret Correspondence, May 21, 1776. 
Ibid. II, p. 91. 



The Bcoiniiino- of Diplomatic Relatio)is. 31 

errand. The}' iustructed liiui to introduce liiniself to the 
Count de Vergennes as a mercliant, ask for a suj^ply of arms 
and ammunition on the credit of Congress and, in case of 
refusal, request permission to buy in France as hirge a 
quantity of these articles as he could pay for or obtain on 
credit. If received with favor, he was to ask whether the 
Colonies might hope for an alliance, commercial or defensive, 
with France ; and at what time she would l^e ready to 
recognize them.' He was given no }>ower, however, to con- 
clude a treaty. 

On his arrival in France, in June, 1776, Deane was told 
that he could probably accomplish nothing, as a new reign 
had lately begun ; several departments of the government, 
notably that of finance, were deranged ; and the King and 
his ministers wished to keep the peace. Yet Deane easil}^ 
obtained an audience with Vergennes, and Was partly suc- 
cessful in the commercial half of his errand. Vergennes 
told him that the Court could not openly encourage the 
shipping of warlike stores to America, but would place no 
obstacles in the way. He invited Deane to avail himself of 
the privilege, open to all American merchants, of carrying 
on every kind of connnerce allowed to the traders of any 
nation. He refused to discuss the feasibility of a treaty 
while events were .so uncertain, but he questioned Deane 
about the resources of the Colonies and the strength of their 
union." 

This interview was an auspicious beginning, and Deane 
soon detected further evidence of ministerial good-will, in 
an offer of Beaumarchais to procure on credit the supplies 
which the Colonies had ordered. Deane suspected that 
Beaumarchais was supported by the government, because 
he did not, like other merchants, require securities endorsed 
by a banker or a well-known man of business ; and M. 
Gerard, Vergennes' first secretary, confirmed the suspicion 
by telling Deane that he could safely rely on Beaumarchais' 

'Committee of Secret Correspondence to Deane, March 3, 1776. 
r)i])lomatic Correspondence, II, p. 78. 

M)eane to Committee of Secret Correspondence, Aug. 18, 1776. 
Ibid. II, p. 112. 



2,2 l''rancc a)id t/ie American Revolution . 

commercial t-iij^agements. Tlie two agents soon came to an 
agreement, Beanmarchais jiromising to furnish supplies, and 
Deane pledging the credit of Congress to pay for them in 
tobacco or other American products.' 

Beaumarcliais knew lunv to obtain powder and arms from 
the state arsenals. Because the exportation of this mer- 
chandise was forbidden, and because it could not even be 
carried to tlie sea-coast without publicity, he suggested to 
Deane the advantage of having influential friends at court. 
With this in view, he advised him to send officers to America 
with the stores, " and, by fixing on such as should be 
recommended by persons at court, or of influence by their 
connections, to procure . . . friends and patrons." It is 
due to Beanmarchais to state that he also believed the 
Americans too inexperienced in the art of war to manage 
artillery without the aid of foreign officers. Deane listened 
to his advice, and the crowd of officers, " all brave as their 
swords," who besieged the American agents in Paris, per- 
plexed Congress, and harassed Washington, was a direct re- 
sult of this ingenious scheme." 

The Ministry winked at the little emigration, but was 
careful to avoid responsibility. Of all the officers who 
crossed the water, four enguieers were the only ones .sent by 
the government.' 

Even with the aid of inlluential friends, the work of sup- 
plying the American army was not easy. Beaumarcliais 
informed Congress in August that he had procured two 
hundred brass cannon, a large amount of ammunition, and 
a quantity of clothing for the troops. Everything promised 
well, and Deane hoped that the troops would sail in October.* 

•Diplomatic Correspondence, II, ])p. ii6 ff. Beauniarchai.s to 
Deane, Julv 18, 1776. Deane to Reaiiniarchais, July 20, 24. Ibid. II, 
pp. 99, 102, 105. 

■^Deane's Address to Congress, Dec. 1778. vSparks MSS., LII, vol. 
I, p. 104. Beanmarchais to Deane, July 26, 1776. Deane to Beanmar- 
chais, July 27. Deane Papers, I, pjx 164, 166. 

•'Memoirs of Lafayette, I, p. 70. 

*Roderique Horlalez and Co. to Committee of Secret Correspond- 
ence, Aug. 18, 1776. Deane to R. Morris, Sept. 17. Diplomatic Cor- 
respondence, II, pp 129, 148. 



The />eo!}i?iiuQ of Diplomatic Relations. 33 

But the British ambassador spread a report that Congress 
was treating with General Howe, and at once the supply of 
government stores was checked. Soon after this a native of 
Maryland, in the service of France, insinuated that Deane 
was trying to bring about a reconciliation with Great Britain 
and planning to use the supplies against France. These 
rumors, annoying as they were, caused little delay. A far 
more serious obstacle was the indifference produced in the 
Ministry by news of the serious defeat on L,ong Island. 
This disaster threatened to wreck American hopes, in France 
as well as at home. Another reason for ministerial coldness 
was the delay in receiving news from America. The British 
were so active at sea that it was November before an official 
announcement of the Declaration of Independence arrived 
in France.' In the meantime the English were on the watch 
for suspicious shipments, and, in order to escape the notice 
of their spies, the government hindered the loading and 
despatching of Beaumarchais' vessels almost as persistently 
as if it had disapproved the enterprise. At last, "after 
orders and counter-orders and manoeuvers the very history 
of which," Deane said, " would fill a volume," the Amphi- 
trite set sail on the fourteenth of December, laden with 
military stores and carrying a number of officers for the 
American service. She had been loaded at night, — over a 
hundred men working together in confusion, crowding in 
stores picked up by lighters from the nearest points of the 
shore, with little regard to the invoice.^ The cause of this 
haste was an indiscretion on the part of Beaumarchais. While 
superintending the affairs of his mercantile house he had 
called attention to himself by directing the rehearsals of one 
of his comedies. The English ambassador had learned 
where he was, and why ; and the Ministry had been forced 
to take notice of his doings. A government embargo caught 
his other ships and detained them in port. Unfortunately, 

' Deane to Committee of Secret Correspondence, Oct. 1, 17, 25, 1776. 
Diplomatic Correspondence, II, pp. 153, 173, 1S3. Deane to Ver- 
gennes, about Nov. <S. Stevens Facsimiles, 592. 

^Beaumarchais to Deane, Dec. 17, 1776. Deane Papers, I, p. 424, 



34 



France and the American Revolution. 



through the selfish caprice of an officer on board the 
Amphitrite, that ship was brought back to L' Orient, and 
there detained. For several weeks the enterprise remained 
at a standstill. It was not until the last of January, 1777, 
that Beauniarchais received the welcome news that three of 
his vessels had .sailed. In February, he despatched a fourth ; 
early in March, he reported eight ships at sea and one load- 
ing ; in the first week of May, the ninth ship sailed, and 
Beauniarchais heard that three of his cargoes had arrived in 
America. These supplies came just in time for the camj)aign 
of 1777, and were e.specially welcome by reason of an alarm- 
ing scarcity of guns, due to the fact tliat many of the .soldiers, 
at the end of their .short terms of service, not only refused to 
re-enli.st, but carried home the government property.' 

It must not be suppo.sed that Beauniarchais' fir.st nine car- 
goes, to say nothing of later ones, were paid for out of the 
million livres which he obtained from the French treasury 
in June, 1776. In August of the same year, he received an 
equal amount from Spain, and over a million livres were 
contributed by France during 1777.' Besides this, he bor- 
rowed money, like an ordinary merchant, from wealthy 
individuals. During one year, he shipped to America stores 
to the value of five million livres. 

The terms on which the French government advanced 
the money, especially the first million, have been and rtre 
still the subject of much discu.ssion. The disputed question 
is whether the money was intended as a gift to the Ameri- 
cans or as a loan to Beauniarchais, capable of being con- 
verted into a gift if his losses were so great as to call for 
some recompense. On the former supposition, the amount 
ought to have been deducted from the bill which Beau- 
niarchais presented to the United States for services ren- 
dered ; on the latter, the United States had no claim on it, 
and Beauniarchais was responsible only to the French 

'Deane to Gerard, Jan. 7, 1777. Beauniarcliai.s to Vergeniies, Jan. 
7, 30; Feb. 4, Mar. 7, May 4. Vergennes to Gerard, Jan. 7. Stevens 
Facsimiles, 617, 912, 916, 1424, 1445, 1526, 618. Deane's Address to 
Congress, Dec, 1778. Sparks MSS., LII, Vol. I, p. 92. 

-' Beauniarchais and his Times, III, pp. 130, 165. 



Tlie Beginning of Diplomatic Relations. 35 

Ministry. The doubt on this point caused dissensions 
among the American Commissioners in Europe, and fac- 
tional disputes in Congress ; deprived Beaumarcliais of the 
remittances from America, which he claimed in return for 
his outlay ; and gave rise to a law-suit half a century long, 
which ended in a compromise between the United vStates 
and the heir of Heaumarchais, to the great disadvantage of 
the claimant. To decide this question, on which congres- 
sional committees and attorneys general of the United States 
have disagreed, is exceedingly difficult, even with the aid 
of the documents, both private and official, now open to the 
public ; but a few facts may be given on either side. 

Against the claim of Beaumarcliais we may place, first, 
the statements of Arthur Uee. Uee said that Beaumarcliais 
told him in 1775 that France would furnish the United 
States with /,'200,ooo, to be sent by way of the West Indies. 
He claimed that, after the plan of direct remittance had 
been changed to that of utilizing a commercial company, 
the appearance of commerce was only a blind, and no pay 
was expected in return for the supplies. An entry in Lee's 
Journal, for October 3, 1777, tells us that M. Grand, a 
banker with whom the Americans had dealings, coming- 
direct from Vergennes, brought word that Congress " need 
give themselves no trouble about making returns ; that 
nothing which we had received or were to receive was lent, 
but to be considered as given." ' In line with this testi- 
mony is a letter written by Vergennes to the ambassador in 
Spain, Maj' 3, 1776, in which the following words occur : — 
" All will be done in the name of a commercial society 
directed by a merchant of one of our maritime towns, who 
will take securities — not very binding, to be sure ; but will 
color his zeal vi'itli the motive, plausible enough on the part 
of a merchant, of desiring to attract to himself the largest 
part of the American commissions when the commerce of 
the Colonies shall be rendered free by the declaration of 
their independence." '"■' The fact that Beaumarcliais, in 
pressing his claim, falsely stated that the supplies were 

' Life of Arthur Lee, L P- 336. 

'■^ Vergennes to d'Ossvin, May 3, 1776. Doniol, L p. 375- 



^6 France and the Amcricaii Revolution. 

bought with his own money,' would seem ahnost conclusive 
evidence against him, if it had not been impossible for him 
to explain the matter truthfully without divulging govern- 
ment secrets. 

One of the strongest arguments in favor of Beaumarchais 
may be drawn from his own plan of operations, submitted to 
the King in the fall of 1775.' He asked the French govern- 
ment to entrust him with a million livres, half of which he 
would send to America in the form of coin, and the rest in 
powder. He asked leave to buy the powder from the state 
magazines, at the government rate of from four to six sols a 
pound ; intending to sell it to the insurgents at the market 
price of from twenty to thirty sols, and invest the difference 
in more supplies for the Americans. By a clever calculation, 
whose weakest point was reliance on remittances that never 
arrived, he proved that the King, by advancing one million 
livres, could make enough money to invest three million in 
the second venture and nine in the third. '' If it were certain 
that this plan was adopted, Beaumarchais' reputation would 
be cleared. 

One of the most baffling elements in the puzzle is, that 
most of the evidence seems to be of little value. Nothing 
could be more positive than the assertions of Arthur Lee, 
that all the supplies advanced by the French Court were 
intended as a gift ; but, after repeating this declaration again 
and again, Lee finally owned that he did not know whether 
they were so intended or not. If, as Lee recorded, Vergennes 
told M. Grand in October, 1777, that no return was expected 
for the supplies, he also wrote to Gerard in September, 1778 : 
The Commi.ssioners "insinuate that all, or at least a large 
portion, of what has been sent is on account of His Majesty. 
I am about to reply that the King has not furnished any- 
thing ; that he has simply allowed M. de Beaumarchais to 
provide himself with what he wanted in the arsenals, on con- 
dition of replacing what he took."' Again, in 1779, he 

' Journal of Arthur Lee, Dec. 24, 1777. Ufe, I, 369. 

^Possibly in February, 1776. 

3 Deane Papers, I, p. 108. 

* A Vindication of Arthur Lee, p. 36. 



The Beginning of Diplomatic Relations. 37 

declared through Gerard that Beamnarchais was " the credi- 
tor of the United States, and at the same time debtor to the 
King." ' These statements might be taken as conclusive if 
diplomats always spoke the truth. When the United States 
government, learning by accident that a million livres had 
been advanced by France, requested an explanation, \'er- 
gennes merely kept silence and refused to name the person 
to whom the money had been paid. His successors, unable 
to conceal the agency of Beaumarchais, stoutly and falsely 
averred that the money " was for an object of secret political 
services, the knowledge of which the King had reserved to 
himself," and that it was unjust " to confound this political 
object with the mercantile operations of the same individual 
with Congress."" While a witness who perverts the truth 
ordinarily throws discredit on the cause which he represents, 
the attempts of the French government, repeated through a 
period of fifty years, to secure attention to the claim of 
Beaumarchais, may be regarded as a strong point in his 
favor. It is hard to imagine why a succession of ministers 
should have devoted so much effort and prevarication to the 
support of a groundless demand. 

While Deane, with the aid of Beaumarchais, was obtain- 
ing supplies for the Americans, he did not neglect the polit- 
ical side of his mission. He promptly announced to the 
French Court the Congressional resolution of May 15, the 
forerunner of the Declaration of Independence ; and, pre- 
dicting that this re.solution would soon be followed by im- 
portant instructions with regard to France, he asked aid 
for his country. A month later he submitted an elaborate 
memorial on American trade, in the hope of persuading 
France to abandon her restrictive system and open her own 
ports and those of her colonies to American commerce. ' He 
did not obtain all the concessions which he desired for his 
countrymen, but they were liberally treated. The authorities 
allowed them to import certain prohibited articles and to con- 

' Claim of Beaumarchais' Heir, p. 4. 
nbid., p. 8. 

•'July 18, Aug. 15, 1776. Stevens Facsimiles, 572, 577. .See Dip- 
lomatic Correspondence, II, p. 126. 



38 France and the American Revohitioji. 

tiiuie to export arms and aniimmition. " The registers must 
not contain any item nor any indication of this connivance, 
entire liberty being left to the Americans to load and export 
as they please the articles in question:" — such were Ver- 
gennes' significant orders.' 

Not all the commercial privileges which France gave to 
the Americans were necessarily violations of international 
law. The French theory of the rights of neutral trade was 
broader than the English. It embraced the principle that 
free ships make free goods ; while England claimed that an 
enemy's goods, even in a neutral ship, were liable to confisca- 
tion. If the Americans could beconsidered a separate power 
at war with England, France, according to her own doctrine, 
had the right to trade with them. England, of C(jurse, de- 
nied both the premise and the conclusion. If, on the con- 
trary, the Americans were colonies, France admitted that 
England, if powerful enough, might prevent them from 
trading with French citizens, but denied her right to for- 
bid French citizens to trade with them : — a distinction which 
the Bourbon monarch would hardl}' have maintained if his 
own colonies had been the ones concerned. There are two 
kinds of commerce, said the French authorities : that which 
confines its dealings to ordinary merchandise, and that which 
includes contraband articles. Even if our citizens indulge 
in contraband trade, this constitutes no breach of neutralit}" , 
but merely renders the goods subject to confiscation.' With 
this careful definition of the rights in question France veiled 
her connivance at prohibited trade. 

While playing fast and loose with international obliga- 
tions, the Ministry assumed a defiant attitude in the face of 
British protest. An unofficial agent of the English govern- 
ment having called the French charge d' affaires to account, 
for the presence of Deane in Paris, Vergennes made this 
comment : " He surely knows that the King is master in his 
own house, that he has no account to render to any one con- 
cerning the strangers whom he tliinks proper to admit into 
his vStates, and that His Majesty does all that Great Britain 

' Vergennes to Clugny, Sept. 22. Stevens Facsimiles, 1365. 
'■'Sparks' translation and abridgment of Rayneval's Observations 
sur le Manoire Jnsticatif dc la Coiir de Londres. .Sparks' MSS., LI. 



Tlie Begimiino of Diplomatic Rclatioin. 39 

could demand as a favor, in not receiving openly a repre- 
sentative on the part of the English Colonies." ' 

The expression, even in a private letter, of a sentiment so 
uncompromising, indicated the approach of a crisis. At 
this time, France and vSpain were seriously considering a 
declaration of war against England. Spain, on the eve of a 
contest with Portugal, in which Ivngland might be expected 
to take part with her ally, had one more reason than usual 
for desiring the co-operation of France. Late in August, 
the Spanish ambassador d'Aranda tried, in an unofficial 
interview with Maurepas, to persuade him that the time for 
an attack on England had come. It was believed in Spain 
that no effort to keep tlie peace would long be successful ; 
and that it would be wise to take the offensive and anticipate 
the dreaded attack. There was no proposal to form an 
alliance with the Americans. The reason or pretext for 
hesitation was the advantage of waiting until another cam- 
paign had shown how nuich aid the Colonists could give to 
an ally." 

In a iiirmoire laid beftjre the King and Council as a result 
of the Spanish overtures, Vergeinies reviewed the arguments 
in favor of war, but gave the proposals of France a turn 
which might easil}' prove obnoxious to vSpain, and so defer 
the critical moment. Once more, he declared that a war 
with England could be justified as a measure of self-defense ; 
for England was so jealous of- the increasing naval power of 
France that only the necessity of concentrating her forces in 
America restrained her from giving v^ent to her einuity. He 
gave the impression that France would welcome a war with 
C/reat Britain, if it could be waged without the intervention 
of other European powers ; and that, unlike vSpain, she saw 
advantage in an alliance with America. In order to 
avoid the danger of arousing jealousy of the increasing 
power of France, he suggested that Spain might begin the 
war, and allow France to enter as her auxiliary.'' 

' Vergenties to Garnicr, Aug. 31, 1776. Doniol, I, p. 5S3. 

'^Grimakli to d'Aranda, Aug. 26, 1776. Bancroft MvS.S., ,-i/;77//r'r5 
FrcDifaiscs, Espague, 1 768-1 776, p. 267. 

■' Considerations read to the King in Committee, on the course to be 
taken with regard to Enghmd, Aug. 31, 1776. Stevens Facsimiles, 897. 



40 France and the American Revolution. 

Thus called on to act as principal, Spain beat a prompt 
retreat. Maintaining still that war could not long be 
avoided, her minister developed a doubt whether the proper 
moment had arrived. He feared that, while France and 
Spain were attacking England, she might make ])eace with 
America and turn her forces against them. Another reason 
for objecting to hasty action, a reason ominous of future dis- 
agreement between Spain and her ally, was the necessity of 
deciding beforehand on some plan of operations. Incident- 
ally, d'Aranda expressed a desire to drive the Knglish from 
Jamaica and Minorca.' 

Before this reply reached the French Court, Vergennes 
heard news that made him even less desirous of war than 
before, — that of the American defeat on Tx)ng Island. The 
fate of New York was not known ; but, in its bearing on the 
foreign policy of France, it was considered immaterial. 
Even if New York was in the hands of the British there 
would no longer be any reason for haste in attacking Eng- 
land or declaring for the Americans. They were not likely 
to submit after one defeat ; and the occupation of their 
strongholds would keep the common enemy busy. Besides, 
delay would give France and Spain time for further prepara- 
tion, and at the same time exhaust the resources of England. 
Meanwhile, it would be possible " to direct the furnishing of 
aid to the Colonies in such a way as to force the English into 
becoming the aggressors themselves ; in this capacity", " said 
Vergennes, with his eye on the danger of a continental war, 
"they would lose their right to the interest which several 
powers might take in not seeing them crushed." "' 

In this wa3' the military disasters in America fixed, for 
the time being, the hesitating course of the two European 
powers. "After all," said a French noble,' " France was 
not fool eiu)Ugli to pla)' such a silly game as vSpain did in 
the la.st war, when she got so soundly drubbed for espousing 
a ruined cause." 

' Grinialdi lo d'Aranda, Oct. 8, 1776, Doiiiol, I, pp. 60S-612. 

^Garnier to Vergennes, Oct. 1 1, 1776. Vergennes to the King, Oct. 
17, 26. Vergennes to d'Aranda, Nov. 5. Ibid., I, pp. 615, 618, 620, 
682-4. 

^ The Duke de Chartres. 



The Bi'ginnino of Diplomatic Relations. 41 

In the midst of the discussion between the French and 
Spanish Cabinets, Deane called attention to the Declaration 
of Independence, — the adoption of which was a well-known 
fact, although it had not been officially announced, — and 
asked for an answer to the questions, whether France would 
recognize the United States and receive an ambassador from 
them, and whether the}^ might hope for an alliance. "The 
moment approaches," wrote Beaumarchais to \"ergennes, 
" when you will have to say yes or no. I would go and 
hang myself immediately if it were the latter." Beaumar- 
chais was mistaken. The moment was receding. Deane 
continued to wait for an answer to his questions. He 
waited, too, in a state of distress " beyond the power of 
language to paint," for official news of the Declaration of 
Independence, and power to negotiate a treaty. He at- 
tributed the failure of his efforts to the negligence of Con- 
gress, not knowing that, since the tidings from Long Island, 
the Americans could hope for only enough aid to keep them 
from succumbing.' 

At the moment when the fortune of America was lowest 
in official circles, tiie powerful force of public opinion began 
to make itself felt in our favor. "It is difficult," .says a 
French historian of this period, "for governments, even 
ab.solute ones, to resist a movement of public opinion when 
it extends to all classes, from the summit of society to 
its lowest foundations."" It is more difficult when, in 
addition to this, the king lacks strength and is desirous of 
wiiuiing popular favor. It is hardest of all when the 
general cry is for war, and when a popular war-minister in 
exile has a strong party of friends at court. Choiseul is 
said to have disapproved of the alliance with the United 
States, and to have wished merely to use the Americans for 
the exhaustion of Rngland ; ■' but, however persistently he 
opposed the measures of Vergennes, every influence in favor 
of w-ar was pu.shing the country with almost irresistible logic 
tQward an American alliance. 

^ Mi' mo ire of Deane, vSept. 24, 1776. Stevens Facsimiles, 5S5. 
Beaumarchais to Vergennes, Sept. 25. Ibid., 898. 
^Capefigue, Louis XVI, II, p. 34. 
' vSoulavie, Menioires, III, p. 412. 



42 France and the American Revolution. 

During the first months of our Revohition, the French 
public knew little of the incidents or the merits of the strug- 
gle ; but Deane's attempt to gain friends at court by con- 
ferring favors on military officers, soon made the insurgent 
cause popular among the young nobility ; and they, in turn, 
enlisted the enthusiastic sympathy of the Queen . At the same 
time the admission of American traders to French ports en- 
gaged the interest, less conspicuous but equally important, 
of the mercantile class ; and the struggle of the insurgents 
for republican self-government won the support of the 
philosophers and their followers, who formed a large and 
influential body, and who appreciated American political 
ambitions all the more because they took it for granted that 
these aspirations were borrowed from their own writings.' 
Radical theories had spread through the entire younger gen- 
eration of French society. The military nobility were 
attracted toward the American cause, not only through am- 
bition, desire of adventure, weariness of peace, and hatred of 
Fviigland, but through their recently acquired admiration for 
republican and democratic institutions. Under the influ- 
ence of such motives, Lafayette, among others, determined 
to offer his services to Washington. F^'inding that the disas- 
ter of Long Island had placed a serious ob.stacle in the way 
of the shipments directed by Deane and Beaumarchais, and 
that he could not hope to reach America soon on one of their 
vessels, he offered to buy and equip a ship on his own ac- 
count ; and, eluding the vigilance of the Ministry, he made 
his way to the scene of action. The escapade of Lafayette 
greatly increased the popularity ot the American cause. As 
time passed and news of the battles in which he and his 
companions figured, reached France, tlie court and even the 
ministers felt their interest quicken. With the army, " de- 
sertion became a fashion." A friend of Lafayette" has 
recorded that Maurepas said more than once "that it was 
the impetuous ardor of the young courtiers and the F'rench 
warriors which had cried down the wisdom of the Council 

• S^gur, Alciiioircs, 1, pp. 74, 80 ; II, p. 43. 
"Mbid., I, p. 80. 



The Begi)ining of Jhploiiiatic Relations. 43 

and, so to speak, forced tlie governineiit into war." Ac- 
cepting this statement as true of Maurepas and the King, 
we may believe that X'ergennes, though he sometimes vacil- 
lated, followed a consistent policy in the main, and advised 
the recognition of America for reasons of state. 

The desirability of an alliance had been debated in 
America as well as in France. The question was closely 
bound up with that of independence. The more radical 
element in Congress had asserted that the Colonies could 
hope for no European assistance until they declared their inde- 
pendence ; the more cautious members had feared that such a 
declaration would place them in the power of foreign nations. 
"France," they said, "will take advantage of us when 
they see we cannot recede, and demand severe terms of us ; 
.... she and Spain, too, will rejoice to see Britain and 
America wasting each other." In spite of these fears, a 
committee had t)een appointed on the twelfth of June, 1776, 
to draw up a plan of treaties for presentation to foreign 
powers.' Dr. Franklin and John Adams were the most dis- 
tinguished members. Adams, with all his enthusiasm for 
independence, saw the threatening danger, and always in- 
sisted that any connection established with foreign powers 
should be purely commercial. In his work on the com- 
mittee, he held his colleagues rigidly to this principle. On 
the supposition that France would not accept a distinctly 
commercial treaty, many motions were offered to insert 
"articles of entangling alliance, of exclusive privileges, 
and of warranties of possessions;" but they were all 
defeated," and the draft submitted to Congress for debate 
w^as that of a perpetual treaty of amitj' and commerce, 
drawn up with special reference to France. It contained 
a stipulation that if England should attack France in conse- 
quence of the treaty, the United States would not aid 
England. As some of the members of Congress feared that 
France would not be satisfied with a mere promise of neu- 
trality, the plan was reconsidered. John Adams was absent 
at the time ; but in spite of the withdrawal of his restrain- 

' Secret Journals of Congress, II, pp. 475-7. 

^ Life and Works of John Adams, II, pp. 516-7 ; IX, p. 409. 



44 France and the American Revolution. 

ing influence, the concessions which were made did not 
greatlj' alter the spirit of the treaty. The Commissioners 
were instructed to promise, if necessary, that the United 
States would never acknowledge allegiance to Great Britain 
nor grant more coinmercial privileges to her than to France ; 
and also to stipulate that no treaty for ending the war be- 
tween the United States and Great Britain or between Great 
Britain and France should take effect until six months after 
the allies had notified each other. Thus modified, the plan 
of treaty was agreed to by Congress, September 17, 1776. 
Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Jefferson, and vSilas Deane 
were chosen Commissioners to treat with France ; but Jeffer- 
son declined to serve, and Arthur Lee was appointed in his 
place.' 

Early in November, Deane's painful suspense was relieved 
by an ofificial announcement of the Declaration of Inde- 
pendence, and news that Congress had a plan of treaty 
under consideration. On notifying the Mini.stry, Deane 
was met by the question : What would the United States 
gain from the acknowledgement of their independence, 
unless this were followed by a war against Great Britain ; 
.since they already enjoyed all the other advantages which 
would accrue to them from such an acknowledgtnent ? It 
was intimated that in one respect the change would be a 
di.sadvantage : it would i)lace the United States under addi- 
tional obligations to France." 

Though the Declaration of Independence had no immedi- 
ate effect on the policy of the government, it justified itself, 
in France as in America, l)y its influence on public opinion. 
Expressing, as it did, the h^ngli.sh in.stinct for liberty in the 
formulas of French political philo.sophy, it was sure to in- 
crea.se the popular enthusiasm for the young republic' 

Soon after the Americans had taken the irrevocable step, 
Vergennes marked out in a tentative way the general lines 

'Secret Journals of Congres.s, II, pp. 27 IT., 31, 35. 
* Stevens Facsimiles, 592. Deane lo Committee of vSecrct Corre- 
spondence, Nov. 28, 1776. Diplomatic Correspondence, II, p. 197. 
' Capefij^ne, Louis XVI, II, ]). 38. 



The Beginning of Diplomatic Relations. 45 

which the French goveniinent afterward tried to follow.' 
He wished to postpone the war with England until the end 
of 1777, when he thought the naval and military prepara- 
tions of France and Spain would be completed. Kven then, 
they were not to take the aggressive or to call for allies : 
they would leave that to England. Would it be well, he 
asked the Spanish minister, to conclude an alliance with the 
Americans, offensive while the war lasted and defensive 
from the conclusion of peace? As Spain was betraying 
solicitude with regard to the objects of the war, he urged 
that the abasement of England and the destruction of her 
commerce should be made their primary aim. Thus, bv the 
close of 1776, a fairly definite plan was shaping itself out of 
the fluctuating counsels of the French Ministry. 

' Vergennes to d'Aranda, Nov. 5. 1776. Vergennes to d'Ossun, Dec. 
8. Sparks MSS., LXXX, vol. I, pp. 116, 133. Plan de measures 
a eoncerter avec VEspagtie, Dec. 1776. Bancroft ilSS., Archives 
Frangaises, Espagne, 1 768-1 776, p. 2S9. 



IV. 

THE DEMAND FOR RECOGNITION. 



When the British ambassador heard that FraiikHii was on 
the way to Paris he threatened, it is said, to leave without 
cerenion}-. Vergennes told him that a message had already 
been sent to intercept Franklin and forbid him the country ; 
but that, as his route was uncertain, the courier might fail 
to meet him.' This messenger, if he existed, was con- 
venientl}' unsuccessful ; for Franklin arrived in Paris in the 
last part of December. On the following day, he and Deane 
were joined by Arthur Lee. The Connnissioners informed 
Vergennes of their powers, and asked for an audience. 
Vergennes received them in secret, renewed his promise of 
commercial facilities, and presented them to the ambassador 
of Spain. From this time until the revocation of their com- 
missions, the Deputies labored to obtain aid and recognition 
for their country. Their success has won them fame. 
Their most conspicuous failure has been mercifully obscured 
by time ; namel^^ their inability to preserve harmony among 
themselves. The three colleagues had not been long in 
France when they and two other agents of Congre.ss then in 
Paris became involved in a lively quarrel, which .spread to 
their constituents in Congress, delayed and complicated the 
public business, and introduced personal rancor into ques- 
tions of international policy which needed for their decision 
as clear and unbiased judgment as any problems which have 
ever confronted the American Congress. Fortunately, it is 
not necessary to enter into the petty details of the.se disagree- 
ments ; but whoever desires a complete picture of the life of 
our representatives in Paris, should remember that they 
were zealous in their enmities as well as in devotion to their 
public duties. Franklin was the only one who had self- 
control ; and this very (juality was an added source of ex- 
asperation to his opponents. 

' Lescure, Correspoiulaiice Secrete, I, p. 2. 



Tlic Pcniaiid for Recognitio}! . 47 

The Deputies not only addressed themselves to the Min- 
istry, but tried to enlist public opinion in favor of the 
American cause. A larj^e jiart of their success with the 
people, however, was unpremeditated. The simplicitv of 
their costumes and manners won the approval of a society 
enthusiastic for democratic plainness and equality. They 
were comjiared to citizens of the ancient republics of Greece 
and Rome. The most eminent men of the kingdom sought 
their acquaintance. Franklin, especially, made himself the 
idol of the hour. Gifted with a natural comprehension of 
the French character, he won his way with an adroitness 
which may have been unstudied, but which has been attrib- 
uted to art. " He showed himself little," .said a French 
historian, "as all men do who wish to exert a mysterious 
influence ; but he made peoi)le speak of him a great deal., . 
. . . His simple air concealed extreme shrewdne.ss ; he un- 
derstood that in France it is necessary to get one's self talked 
about, and talked about continually, if one wishes to remain 
ma.ster of ])ublic opinion, and he did not fail to do it." ' 

As soon as po.ssible after their arrival in Paris, the Com- 
missioners submitted the proposed treaty to Vergennes, and 
asked France to sell eight ships of the line and a supply of 
munitions to the United vStates and to provide a convoy at 
the expense of Congress.^ 

In his surprise at the moderate terms of the treaty, Ver- 
gennes wrote to d'Ossun, the ambassador in Spain, with 
some exaggeration, that the Americans really asked for 
nothing which they did not already enjoy. "If it is 
modesty," he said, " if it is fear of being a burden to powers 
on whose interest they think they can rely, the sentiments 
are very praiseworthy." But he suspected that they secretly 
wi.shed to provoke England, by the loss of her commerce, 
into declaring war ; and, at the same time, to avoid any en- 

' Capefigue, Louis XVI, II, pp. 44, 15. 

^American Commissioners to Vergennes, Dec. 23, 1776, vStevens 
Facsimiles, 606. Memoh'e, Jan. 5, 1777. Ibid., 614. Franklin and 
Deane to Committee of Secret Correspondence, Jan. 17, March 12. 
Franklin, Deane, and Lee to Vergennes, Jan. 5. Diplomatic Corres- 
pondence, II, ])p. 248, 283, 245. 



48 France and the American Revohitio7i. 

gagemetit which would outlast the conflict. The application 
for ships of the line confirmed his suspicion. This favor 
was refused, as courteously as possible, and the request for 
convo}' met the same fate. The question how to avoid 
either accepting or rejecting the proffered treaty, was more 
serious. At first, Vergennes thought of a declaration of 
commercial reciprocity, but he feared that it would be con- 
strued as a refusal, and would lead to a reconciliation be- 
tween the contending parties. The reply which was finally 
given was, that at present France had not enough interest 
in an alliance with America to justify her in risking a war ; 
and that, while future events might make an alliance 
desirable, it was best in the mean time not to "anticipate 
time and events." In a letter to d'Ossun, Vergennes went 
.so far as to say that he did not wish an alliance with 
America. He put no faith in the honor of republics, and 
he did not see what security France could have for the 
fidelity of the Americans. But if England .should declare 
war again.st France or Spain .such an alliance might become 
valuable, and with this contingency in view he left an open- 
ing for future negotiations.' 

The Spanish Mini.stry were still more emphatic in their 
objections to an American alliance, unless in case of an at- 
tack by England.'* They granted that, if the insurgents 
were showing themselves capable of respectable resistance, 
such a connection might be necessary to prevent reconcilia- 
tion with England. But, .said Grimaldi, they continually 
retreat ; the British generals are masters of entire provinces ; 
it is probable that the Americans must .soon submit. Besides, 
their example is to be dreaded. The King " ought to hesi- 
tate greatly to make a formal treaty with provinces which 
cannot yet be considered in any other light than that of 
rebels. . . . The rights of all .sovereigns in their respective 
territories ought to be extremely sacred, and the eixample of 
a rebellion is too dangerous for his Majesty to wish to sup- 
port it openly." 

'Vergennes to d'Ossun, Jan. 4, 12, 1777. Doniol, II. pp. 113, 122. 
Minutes for the Answer of the French King. Approved. Jan. 9. 
Stevens Facsimiles, 622, See also 621. 

^Grimaldi to d'.Vranda, I'^eb. 4, Doniol, II, p. 189. 



Tlic ncDUDid for Recognition . 49 

While repellin^^ the offer of a treaty, the French Court 
granted the Americans a loan of two million Hvres.' This 
gave Congress a little respite from the anxiety which they 
were beginning to feel abont the public credit. The evil 
results of indiscriminate issues of paper money were already 
showing themselves in America. At the close of 1776, 
specie was worth from two to two and a half times as much 
as paper ; but a far greater depreciation was necessary to 
teach otir rulers financial wisdom, and many French mil- 
lions were destined to be sunk in this ever-widening gulf. 

Franklin and his colleagues did not relax their efforts be- 
cause of the first rebuffs. Early in February, 1777, on 
hearing alarming accounts of England's preparations for the 
next campaign, they again tried to persuade Vergennes that 
the Bourbon powers would find it advantageous to declare 
war. At the same time, the Commissioners placed on record 
in a private written agreement their intention, under certain 
circumstances, to exceed their instructions, and hazard the 
censure or the utmost penalty of Congress. That is, if 
France or Spain should conclude a commercial treaty with 
the United States, and be drawn into a war with Great 
Britain in consequence, the Commissioners resolved to 
stipulate that the United vStates would not conclude a 
separate peace, provided the other power concerned would 
give the same pledge." 

Until now, the Commissioners had been acting under their 
first instructions, without official news from America. On 
the fourteenth of March, they received letters containing 
further directions, together with an account of the retreat 
through the Jenseys. Discouraged by repeated misfortunes, 
Congress had voted to offer France a treaty of alliance. 
That this decision did not meet with unanimous approval is 
shown by a letter of John Adams, written a few months 

'Franklin, Deane, and Lee to Gerard, Jan. 14, 1777. To Committee 
of Secret Correspondence, Jan. 17. Diplomatic Correspondence, II, 
pp. 247, 250. 

'Franklin, Deane, and Lee to Vergennes, Feb. i, 1777. Personal 
pledge of Commissioners, Feb. 2. Diplomatic Correspondence, II, 
pp. 257, 260. 



50 France and the Anieriean Revo/ufion. 

later.' " I nuist confess," said he, " that I am at a loss to 
determine whether it is good poHcy in us to wisli for a war 
between France and Britain, unless we could be sure that no 
other powers would engage in it. l>ut if France engages, 
Spain will, and then all ICurope will arrange themselves on 
one side and the other, and what consequences to us might 
be involved in it, I do not know. ... I have very often 
been ashamed to hear so many Whigs groaning and sighing 
with despondency, and whining out their fears that we must 
be subdued, unless France should step in. Are we to be 
beholden to France for our liberties?" The irritation of 
self-reliant patriots like Adams could not bring back the day 
of moderate measures. In order to induce France, if she 
intended war against England, to open hostilities .sooner, the 
United States offered to join her in an attack on the British 
territories and a division of the conque.sts, and to enter into 
a .stipulation that neither party should conclude a separate 
peace. As an inducement to Spain Congress offered not 
only to declare war against Portugal, if a report that she had 
insulted American commerce should prove true, but to " con- 
tinue the said war for the total conquest of that kingdom to 
be added to the dominion of Spain." To such a subversion 
of their principles, discouragement over military reverses led 
the representatives of a people who were fighting for their 
own independence. They were saved from the necessity of 
fulfilling this promise by Spain's rejection of the overtures 
as premature." 

Besides requesting a treaty of alliance. Congress asked for 
a secret loan of two millions sterling, to be .secured by lands 
on the Mississippi or the Ohio. The Commissioners made 
special exertions to obtain this favor, but they were told that 
France could not spare the money. They received permis- 
sion to borrow of private capitalists, on condition that they 

' To James Warren, Apr. 27, 1777. Life and Works, IX, p. 462. 

' Deane to Vergennes, March 15, 1777. Deane on behalf of himself 
and B. Franklin, March 18. Stevens Facsimiles, 655, 659. Secret 
Journals of Congress, II, pp. 36 and 38 ff. Committee of Secret Cor- 
respondence to Commissioners, Dec. 30, 1776. Diplomatic Corres- 
pondence, II, p. 240. D'Ossun to Vergennes, March 24. Bancroft 
MSS. , Archives Framaises, Espaj^iie, 1777, p. 429. 



The Dc)}ia)id fo> Recooiiitioi . 51 

sliDukl not offer more than tlie gt)vernnient rate of interest. 
In tlie existing;" state of American credit, this was eqnivalent 
to a ])roliil)ition. Hnt the second (piarterly instaUment of 
the two milHon Hvres promised in January was fnrnished 
promptly, and the Commissioners were told that payments 
wonld be continued even after the fnll amount had been con- 
tributed. Besides this, the Farmers General entered inttj a 
contract, engaging to place two million livres at their dis- 
posal, and to take American tobacco in return.' 

At this time, the Ministry were keejMng a watchful eye on 
the Deputies, because of certain interviews with which they 
were favored by agents of Great Britain. Although the 
Americans promptlj^ reported these conversations to \'er- 
gennes, he feared that they might be tempted to listen to 
secret proposals from the British government. " We cannot 
conceal from ourselves," he owned, " that what we have 
done so far for the United Colonies is not enough to engage 
their gratitude." '"' Far from meditating concessions to Eng- 
land, the Commissioners were in good spirits over the pros- 
pect of a French war. " It is the universal opinion, " they 
wrote to the Committee at home, " that the peace cannot 
continue another year." Vergennes shared this conviction. 
He expected the outbreak of war within a few months, and 
already thought of warning the fishermen at sea. ' 

The forbearance of England was due to policy, and not to 
any illusion. The British not only learned through spies 
the details of the intercourse between France and America, 

' Stevens Facsimiles, 660, 661 . Deane to Beaumarchais, Macrh 24, 27, 
1777. Beaumarchais to Maurepas, March 30. To Vei-gennes, March 
30 and Apr. i. Stevens Facsimiles, 1493, 1498, 1499, 150x3. Franklin, 
Deane, and Lee to Committee of Secret Correspondence, Apr. 9. Dip- 
lomatic Correspondence, II, p. 2S5. Contract, March 24. Stevens 
Facsimiles, 251. 

- M. Gerard, Report of information received from Mr. Deane. 
Stevens Facsimiles, 675. Vergennes to d'Ossun, Apr. 7, 1777. (Never 
sent.) Doniol, II, p. 341. 

' Connnissioners to Committee of Secret Correspondence, Apr. 9, 
1777. Diplomatic Correspondence, II, p. 289. Inquiry about the pre- 
cautions to be taken against England. Vergennes, Apr. Doniol, II, 
p. 409. Vergennes to d'Ossun, July 18. Ibid., II, p. 451. 



52 France and the American Revolution . 

but they penetrated the secrets of the Cabinet. It was at 
this time that lyord vStorniont wrote : " Tlie Courts of France 
and Spain have had three projects in agitation ; i. To ac- 
cede to the requisitions of the Court of lyondon in pre- 
serving an exact neutralit}- ; 2. To continue the plan formed 
under the Ministry of the Duke of Choiseul, in seeking to 
detach the Colonies from the mother country, and to oppose 
against her a redoubtable rival in the republic formed of the 
thirteen Colonies . . . ; 3. To deceive equally on both 
sides, to promise his Britannic Majesty not to afford an 
asylum to his rebel subjects, and yet to do it under the pre- 
tence of humanity.'" Lord Stormont's information was 
probably correct. The French and Spanish correspondence 
of the time abounds in discussions of the policy of active 
interference and that of temporizing deception. A French 
hi.storian ■ informs us that neutrality also was seriously con- 
.sidered, and that the price to be demanded was the retro- 
cession of Canada. This statement, surprising because at 
variance with repeated of]ficial declarations of intention with 
regard to Canada, is confirmed by a manoire^ attributed to 
Vergennes, written during the war. After setting forth the 
advantages that France would gain by the restitution of 
Canada and Louisiana, the writer suggests that these trans- 
fers be discus.sed in a general Congress of European nations 
at the close of the war, in case the American Colonies ob- 
tain their independence. The main reason given for this 
advice is the danger, — which Vergennes made light of when 
advocating a more vigorous policy, — that the Americans 
may develop a spirit of conquest. 

With these three plans in view, the Ministry are said to 
have made their choice from necessity rather than judgment. 
A contemporary author' describes them as halting between 
the peace policy of the King and the warlike measures urged 
upon them by public opinion, until they were forced to take 
a middle cour.se, deceiving England and the Colonies alter- 

' Capefigue, II, p. 47, note. 

^Capefigue, II, p. 46. 

•' Menioire Historiqiie et Politique sur la Louisiane. 

* S^gur, Mcnioires, I, p. 109. 



TJie Dojiaiid for Rccoguitiov . 53 

iiately, and failing to reap the advantages of either peace or 
war. This statement, while true to appearances, probably 
exaggerates the indecision of the Ministry, especially of 
Vergennes. He adopted the policy of double-dealing so 
early and maintained it so steadily that we may say with 
some confidence, he was not forced into this line of action, 
but chose it. He i^redicted the date of the rupture so ac- 
curately, a year ahead, that we can hardly suppose his final 
decision to have been due solely to a military chance. At 
least, we must believe the chance was welcomed. On 
the other hand, it would be misleading to regard Vergennes 
as a man of unshaken resolution. It cannot be denied that 
he sometimes vacillated. All that can be claimed for him is 
a fairly steady adherence to a policy of compromise. It was 
natural that men like Lafayette, impatient for results and 
unburdened by responsibility, should complain of the 
" labyrinth of precautions, of weaknesses, and of dis- 
avowals," in which the foreign department involved itself. 
But it would have taken a man of iron to remain unmoved 
in the midst of the influences which surrounded Vergennes : 
the King, the people, the intriguing friends of Choi.seul, the 
calculating and obstinate Spaniard. 

While Franklin and Deane labored with the French Min- 
istry, Lee had taken a journey to Spain, in hope of procur- 
ing an alliance. He had been warned off from the capital, 
but had received promises of material aid, which was after- 
ward furnished in moderation. In April, 1777, Spain, under 
the lead of her new minister, Florida Blanca, brought for- 
ward a new project : that Spain and France, adding to the 
weight of their influence by strengthening their colonial de- 
feu.ses, should try to influence the deliberations between the 
American Provinces and England, and also the relations of 
the Provinces among themselves.' France was not im- 
pressed with the wisdom of her ally. " In order to have the 
right to meddle in the internal deliberations of the Colonies," 
Vergennes wrote, "and in the negotiations which they 

' Bancroft's note on a letter of Florida Blanca to d'Aranda, Apr. 7, 
1777. Bancroft MSvS., Archives Fran(,a!ses, Espague, 1777, p. 443. 
See Doniol, II, p. 264. 



54 France and the A)ncrica>i Revolution . 

might have with the nietropohs, it would be necessarj' to 
bind ourselves so closely to them that our respective interests 
would be the same. This would be, assured!}', to place our- 
selves in a state of open though undeclared war with Eng- 
land." Florida Blanca had suggested that France and 
Spain, while acting as mediators, might regain some of their 
lost territory by negotiation with England. In reply, Ver- 
gennesgave the reason for the moderate policy which France 
had already decided to adopt. " If the loss of Canada was 
felt by her," he said, " she ought to regret it the less since 
her forced abandonment of it has become the signal for the 
revolt of the English pos.sessions on the continent. If we 
should think of reinstating ourselves there, we should arouse 
again the old uneasiness and jealousies which ensured the 
fidelity and submission of these same Provinces to England." 
These Provinces, he said, " are not striving to throw off the 
yoke of the mother country in order to run the risk of bow- 
ing beneath that of any other power." ' 

During July and August, .777, the relations between 
France and England became so strained that it appeared 
doubtful whether the Bourbon powers would retain the 
choice between peace and war. The principal cause of irri- 
tation was the treatment accorded to American privateers in 
French ports. In April, 1776, Congress had authorized the 
capture of English vessels," and by the summer of 1777, 
privateering enterprise was at its height. France had en- 
couraged it by ignoring treaty stipulations and allowing the 
.sale of prizes in her ports. ' The Americans responded by try- 
ing with true Yankee ingenuity to force France into war. 
Their captains were ordered to fit out privateers in French 
ports, man them with French sailors, and try to provoke 
the FvUglish to inifair reprisals, in order that France might 
be involved in the claims to compensation.* Encouraged by 

' Vergennes to d'Aranda, Apr. 26, 1777. Doniol, II, p. 273. 

'■■' Journals of Congress, I, p. 304. 

3 Deane to R. Morris, Aug. 23, 1777. Diplomatic Correspondence, 
III P- 379- Beauniarchais to Vergennes, Feb. 20, March 7. Vergennes 
to Noailles, March 21. Stevens Facsimiles, 919, 1445, 1488. 

^Carmichael to Bingham, June 25-July 6, 1777. Diplomatic Cor- 
respondence, II, pp. 347, 348. 



Tlie Demand for Recognition. 55 

tlie leiiiency of the P'reiicli goveninieiit i)rivateers grew 
more and more darmg. vSliips were armed in the ports of 
France, and returned thither with their prizes ; an luiglish 
mail i^acket was carried into Duidcirlc ; a small fleet cruised 
off the coast of luigland and took seventeen or eighteen 
captured vessels to France. " For the first time," we are 
told, " since Britain was a maritime power, the river Thames 
and other of its ports were crowded witli French and other 
ships, taking in freight, in order to avoid the risk of having 
British property captured.'" The English government ])ro- 
tested angrily against the violations of international law. 
Vergennes was ol)liged to act. He relinked the Commis- 
sioners severely, and apologi/.ed for rebuking them ; he had 
a man imprisoned now and then ; he took securities for 
good behavior, that failed to secure it. He .seriously em- 
barrassed the privateers, but did not produce conviction in 
the xAmerican mind. 

The Knglish Ministry were still less convinced. The per- 
sistence with which they made their resentment known sug- 
gested the approacli of an ultimatum. This danger, and the 
constantly recurring fear of an acconmiodation between Eng- 
land and America,'' ma}' have been among the reasons which 
led Vergennes, in July, to advise aggressive measures.'^ He 
declared that the insufficiency of the aid which France had 
given to the insurgents would lend countenance to the belief 
that she merely wished to see England and America wear 
each other out. As the military preparations of France 
were nearly complete, it would be well to anticipate the de- 
signs of England by setting an early date for the connnence- 
ment of hostilities. "If the two Crowns allow January or 
February of 1778 to pass," he said, mentioning in advance 
the ver}^ months in which the treaty with the Americans was 
negotiated, " they will have only to regret the opportunity 
wliich they have neglected." The change from their late 
professions of frientlship toward England might seem unduly 

' Deane's Address to Congress, Dec, 1778. Sparks MSS. LII, vol. I, 
p. 124. 
^Life and Works of John Adams, I, p. 311. 
^ Memoiir, July 23, 1777, Doniol, II, p. 460. 



56 Fra)ice and the American Revolution. 

abrupt : — this he foresaw. But they would have a reason- 
able pretext for their action in Kngland's recent encroach- 
ments on their connnerce, while exercising her so-called 
riglit to search the ships of neutrals for American goods.' 
If they decided on war, they must first of all make sure of 
the Americans by a treaty ; for "it would be inconsistent," 
Vergennes said, "to arm ourselves for them and to allow 
them to lay down their arms." In discussing the plan of 
sending political agents to the Americans, he suggested the 
expediency of persuading them that they would need the 
guaranty of France and Spain. This idea was seized with 
avidity in Spain. The proposal of a guaranty would test the 
sincerity of England ; and if she should unexpectedly give 
her consent, the guarantors might be able to influence the 
terms of the treaty. 

On every other })oint Spain proved intractable. She ob- 
jected to the date suggested by Vergennes, because a 
treasure-ship and a troop-ship which she was expecting from 
America could not arrive so soon. She doubted the wisdom 
of aggression, at a time when it seemed probable that the 
British Ministry would welcome a foreign war as a happy 
release from their embarrassment. She did not wish an 
American alliance, and she did wish Gibraltar. In order to 
make sure of enough causes of complaint to justify a future 
attack on England, she devised a plan as cold-blooded as it 
was likely to be effectual. " We will treat the English with 
justice and dignity . . . while taking care not to give [the 
Ministr\J just motives for complaint, and complaining our- 
selves with firmness but without bitterness, of those which 
they and their nation give us, so that the complaints, multi- 
plying, may assume more consistence." " 

The French Ministry con.sented to postpone the war in 
deference to the wishes of Spain, and \'ergennes took up 
the i)roblem of inducing the Americans to accept a guaranty. 
He hoped to effect this through the messengers whom the 
two Courts were sending to America. He despaired of 

' Vergennes to d'Ossun, July 18, 1777. Doniol, II, p. 451. 
"■ Metnoire of the Court of Spain, Aug. 8, 1777. Sparks MSS., 
LXXX, vol. I, p. 281. 



The Demand for Reeoonition. 57 

gaiiiitii; his point with the Deputies at Paris. They were 
men who would not lend themselves to interested schemes. 
Vergennes complained of their suspicion, their unwilling- 
ness to assume anj' ties unless France engaged to take ]:)art 
in the war, and the calculated indiscretion by which the\' 
were apparently trying to commit France in the sight of 
FvUgland. Still, he would have some proposals of a guaranty 
thrown to them. " If they do not l)ite at this hook," 
he says, he has an alternative plan : namely, to per- 
suade them that they cainiot trust to an acknowledgment of 
their independence by F^ngland ; and that their best security 
would lie in commercial treaties, to be concluded with the 
nations most interested, at the same time with the treaty of 
peace.' For the moment, France halts in the position 
a.ssumed at fir.st by the Americans : — connnercial union, but 
no entangling alliance. 

France had no sooner declared her readiness to wait the 
pleasure of vSpain, than a sudden threat from the British 
government reminded them both that they did not control 
the situation. Through a private agent, whose words could 
be disavowed, the English Ministry demanded that the King 
should surrender without examination all prizes brought 
into his ports by the Americans, publish the orders given to 
his admirals on the subject, and dismiss all the privateers 
who were then in the ports of France. Vergennes prepared 
an answer to these demands — a refusal, tempered by yield- 
ing some minor points. His report was approved by the 
King, on August twenty-third." "If these concessions are 
not enough for Kngland, there can be no further choice." 

Vergennes expected war. He advised that all vessels be 
detained in port for fifteen days, and despatch boats sent 
to the fisheries, the French islands, and the Levant. He 
warned the ambassador at London : " Tlie flame of war is to 
all appearance ready to burst forth, and will probably have 
broken out before my letter reaches you. ... I fear much 
that I shall have the pleasure of seeing you .sooner than I 

' Vergennes to d'Ossun, Aug. 22, 1777. Doniol, II, p. 5cx3. 
■^ Stevens Facsimiles, 706. 



58 hrancc and tlie .iinerica7i Revolution . 

wislied."' Tliose Americans who wanted to drag France 
into war seemed sure of success. But they did not attain it. 
Lord Stormont, who conversed with Maurepas and Ver- 
genneson the luiglish demands, carefully refrained from sup- 
porting these by any official sanction.' The British demon- 
stration ended in an anti-climax, and war was averted. After 
this, the treatment of privateers was discussed in a desultory 
manner, while the increase of armaments for the French and 
Spanish colonies became the crying grievance of England. 
The French Court continued to profess friendship for Great 
Britain, and to give " ver}' essential aids" to the United 
States. " How long these two parts will continue to be 
acted at the same time, the Deputies said, in one of their 
reports, "and which will finally predominate, may be a 
question. As it is the true interest of France to prevent our 
being annexed to Britain . . . we are inclined to believe 
the sincerity is toward us." '^ 

In September, the Commi.ssioners found themselves em- 
barrassed for want of funds. They had ordered a large 
quantit}' of supplies in anticipation of remittances from 
America and of money which Spain had promised them ; 
but the accidents of war had cut off the remittances, and 
Spain, in irritation at the conduct of some American pri- 
vateers, had suddenly withheld her assi.stance. Obeying 
timely orders of Congress, the Deputies appealed to FVance 
and Spain for a loan of eight million livres. News of the 
abandonment of Ticonderoga had recently arrived, and the 
Commissioners were so discouraged that Vergennes became 
alarmed. In order to secure their confidence, he advised 
giving them .some compensation for the rigorous treatment 
to which their privateers had been subjected ; and, on the 
ground that it was "beneath the dignity of two great 
powers to lend," he advocated a subsidy. France asked 
Spain to join her in a contribution of six million livres, on 
condition that the Deputies solennily bind themselves not to 
begin any secret negotiation with England. But the Spanish 

' Vergennes to Noailles, Aug. 23, 1777. Stevens Facsimiles, 1656. 
' Vergennes to Noailles, Aug. 30, 1777. Ihid., 1666. 
•'Sept. 8, 1777. Diplomatic Correspondence, II, p. 38S. 



The Di'Diaiid for J\e('og)iitio)i. 59 

Minislrv, jircfcrriiig- to keep the Americans in expectancy, 
refused to promise any definite amount. Tliou<;li all at- 
tempts to change tliis decision were inisuccessful, France 
resolved to furnish three million livres during the next 
year.' 

France and Spain now carried out their intention of 
sending emissaries to America. The French agent, M. 
Holker. was directed to approach the leaders of Congress, 
inform them of the favors and aids which France had ex- 
tended to the Americans, and impress upon them her 
interest in their independence. It was hoped that he 
could persuade them that their liberties would be insecure 
without a guaranty from France and Spain, and the ex- 
clusion of England from all special commercial privileges. 
He was instructed to try cautiously to find out their senti- 
ments on the subject of connnercial treaties, and to suggest 
that interest would lead them to favor the powers from 
which they expected support. He was also to enquire into 
the state of American resources and the trend of opinion 
among the people and in the Provincial Congres.ses, and to 
find out whether there were any party divisions in Con- 
gress.'^ 

Before these instructions were formulated, a decisive 
event had occurred in America, to convince Vergennes that 
favors, subsidies, and persuasions were not sufficient to 
bind the United States to France. During November, 
rumor said that the fortune of war was turning against the 
F^nglish ; and on December fourth, the Commissioners an- 
nounced the fact of Burgoyne's capitulation.' 

^ Ml' moire submitted to Vergennes and d'Aranda, Sept. 26, 1777. 
Vergennes to d'Ossun, Sept. 26, Nov. 7. Florida Blanca, Oct. 17. 
.Stevens Facsimiles, 1698, 267, 1704, 171 1, 1725. 

'Nov. 25, 1777. Ibid., 1748. 

'Ibid., 716. 



V. 

THK CONCLUSION OF THE TREATY 



The news of Burgoyne's defeat impelled the vacillating 
French Ministr}' to decisive action. The King authorized 
more definite overtures to the American Commissioners. 
Gerard conveyed to them the congratulations of Maurepas 
and Vergennes, with an intimation that the Court v.nshed a re- 
newal of their proposals for an alliance.' At the same time, 
M. Holker, who had not yet sailed for America, was made the 
bearer of an open proflfer of friendship.' The change in the 
situation was explained to him, for the benefit of the Ameri- 
cans, as inolTensively as possible. It was said that the un- 
willingness of European powers to recognize them had been 
due chiefly to the uncertainty of their fortunes. A slight 
cau.se would have been enough to defeat them, and any na- 
tion which had declared for them would have been compro- 
mised to no purpose. Yet the value of the recent succe.ss, 
it was said, lay not .so much in its militar\^ as in its political 
consequences : it would strengthen the credit of tlie Ameri- 
can leaders and ensure popular support for the cause of in- 
dependence. The time had come for closer contact between 
the United States and the European powers. " If the Con- 
gress thinks proper to address instructions to its Commis- 
sioners in France," M. Holker was directed to say, "there 
is every reason to be })ersuaded that they will speedilj' re- 
ceive substantial proofs of the favorable (lisj)osition of the 
Courts of the House of Bourbon." 

' Slatetnetit in the hand of Conite de Vergennes, Dec. 6, 1777. 
Stevens Facsimiles, 1762. Arthur I.ee's Journal, Dec. 6. Life, I, p. 

357- 

^ M. Gerard. Paper dictated to M. le Ray de Chauniont for M. 
Holker. Overtures of a more open policy toward America. Stevens 
Facsimiles, 760. 



The Conclusion of the Treaty. 6 1 

This e.Kplaualioii of tlie change in tiie poHcy of France 
was incomplete, and hence misleading. Nothing was said 
of the motive most conspicnous in the official correspondence 
of those critical days, — the fear that defeat would lead Ivng- 
land to offer terms which the Americans could accept. The 
apprehension was not so much that they would be strong 
enough to wrest their independence from luigland, as that 
she would grant it and proht by the concession. Htjlker's 
instructions give no indication of the anxiety with which 
the French Ministry and its embassy at lyondon were watch- 
ing for the effect of the American victory on the tactics and 
the personnel of the l^ritish Cabinet.' Beaumarchais, who 
had the instincts of a diplomatist, was on the alert at once. 
" What is the real meaning of this crisis? " he wrote to Yer- 
gennes. " It is, that of two nations, English and French, 
the first who recognizes American independence will alone 
gather from it all the fruits, while that independence will be 
certainly fatal to the one who allows her rival to take the 
lead." Vergennes adopted his very words. " L,et us not 
be mistaken." he wrote to the ambassador in Spain ; " the 
Power which first recognizes the independence of the Amer- 
icans will be the first to gather all the fruits of this war." '■' 

The Deputies responded promptly to the friendly hints of 
the Ministry, by formally requesting an answer to their 
proposal of a treaty. They repeated the well-worn argu- 
ment, that the Americans, uncertain with regard to the in- 
tentions of France and ignorant of the secret aids which 
she had furnished, might be tempted by the enemy to 
waver ; and that a treaty concluded at this time would 
strengthen their resolution."^ 

The French Cabinet, convinced that the Americans could 
resist England with .some hope of success, anxious about 
the future course of the British Ministry, and besieged by 

' Garnier to (qy. ) Rayneval, Dec. 5, 1777. Vergennes to Noailles, 
Dec. 6. Stevens Facsimiles, 1755, 1760. 

^Beaumarchais to Vergennes, Dec. 11, 1777. Vergennes to Mont- 
morin, Dec. 11. Ibid., 1768, 1769. 

^ Franklin, Deane, and Lee to Vergennes, Dec. 8, 1777. Diplo- 
matic Correspondence, II, p. 444. 



62 Ff-aiur a)id the Amoican Revolution . 

the military enthusiasts, had decided to conchide a treaty 
with the Americans; and the King, against his will, had 
given his approval. Vergennes granted the Deputies an 
audience on the twelfth of December, 1777. The day be- 
fore this meeting, he wrote to supply the amba.ssador in 
Spain with arguments for an American alliance.' " What 
have we to put in the way," said he, " to prevent the 
Americans lending themselves to a reconciliation ? We 
have no measures, no ties, and no means, in common with 
them." An accommodation would be all the more 
dangerous to France, since war with England now seemed 
inevitable. It would be be.st to enter on this war in alliance 
with the Americans ; for, even if they .should listen to pro- 
posals from England after they had bound themselves to 
France, the con.sequences would not be so serious as those 
which might be expected from a refusal of their demands. 
They might de.sert their ally, but they v^'ould hardly be .so 
base as to attack her. 

In a subsequent letter, Vergennes expressed the opinion 
that Spain's interest in the propo.sed war was ten times as 
great as that of France, since the French islands would 
offer little temptation to the Briti.sh, in comparison with the 
Spanish treasures on the mainland. Looking for every 
argument that would appeal to Spain, he suggested that she 
might regain Florida by the war. He confessed that he did 
not know the sentiments of the Americans on this point ; 
but he thought it natural to suppose that they did not 
.specially care to po.s.sess Florida themselves.'"' 

Meeting the Deputies at the appointed time, Vergennes 
complimented them on the ]irosperous state of American 
affairs, and on the conduct of Washington in giving battle 
to General Howe's army at Germantown ; an unsuccess- 
ful attempt, the boldness of which had impressed him 
as deeply as the victory at Saratoga. Circumstances, he 
said, seemed favorable to an understanding between the 

' Vergennes to Montmorin, Dec. 11, 1777. Stevens Facsimiles, 
1769. 

'^ Vergennes to Montmorin, Dec. 13, 1777. Ibid., 1775. 



The Conclusion of the Treaty. 63 

two countries ; and he promised that the Kini;- would 
examine all the proposals of the Americans and give them 
as many marks of " affection and interest" as possible, re- 
serviui; the rij^ht to conclude nothing without the King of 
Spain. In the informal conversation that followed, \'er- 
gennes encpured into the demands of Congress and indicated 
the terms that iM'ance would accept : — all this, with the 
understanding that the interview should have "no conse- 
se(iuences." The Americans at first ])roposed a mere treaty 
of amity and conunerce ; but \'ergennes, reminding them 
that such a treaty would draw France into war with luigland, 
insisted that the agreement between them should " have all 
the solidit>' of which human institutions are capable." At 
the same time, he assured them that they could not be secure 
without the guaranty of France and vSpain, as long as Eng- 
land retained any lantl on the continent. The Connnis- 
sioners, in turn, renewed the offer of Congress to guarantee 
the American possessions of F'rance and Spain.' 

The reports from England confirmed the government in 
its policy. The party of the Administration was .said to be 
outdoing the Opposition in proposing concessions to the 
Americans, while at the same time it asked for unlimited 
subsidies. If the attempts at conciliation were genuine, for 
what purpose were the subsidies demanded ? The question 
was ominous for France. The situation was critical. Eord 
North might even feel sure enough of support to begin a 
negotiation without waiting until the measure had been 
discussed in Parliament. Vergennes was impatient at the 
length of time that nui.st pass before he could hear from 
Spain. " 1 will not conceal from you,'" he wrote to the 
ambassador, Montmorin, "that the issue makes me 
tremble." " Next came a rumor that the King of England 
was making overtures to Lord Chatham ; and another, that 
Lord Germaine was sending his secretary to Paris, to treat 
with the American Conunissioners. " If his offers are pre- 

' Journal of Arthur Lee. Life, I, p. 360. Statement in the hand of 
Vergennes, marked by the King, " Approiive," Dec. 6, 1777. Stevens 
Facsimiles, 1762. Vergennes to Montmorin, Dec. 13. Ibid., 1774. 

•-'Dec. 13, 1777. Ibid., 1774. 



64 Fra)ice and the American Revolution. 

cise," said V^ergennes, "' if those who receive them have the 
w-ood faitli to ask our advice and decision, what shall we 
reply?" He did not say that France would repl}' by con- 
cluding- a treaty witli the Americans ; but he hinted that if 
she did, Spain would have no right to complain.' 

It was true that an agent of the British government, 
Wentworth by name, was busy with the Deputies. Deane 
reported the conferences to Vergennes. They did not 
threaten any serious results ; but Vergennes learned from 
the reports, that the Ministry had instructed the brothers 
Howe to open a negotiation in America, and that a formal 
proposition had been made to unite with America again.st 
France and Spain. ^ Mr. Wentworth was not the only 
British agent who communicated with the Americans at this 
time. The Londoners showed enough interest in Franklin 
and his colleagues to justify some uneasine.ss on the part of 
France ; and it is not strange that, when these attempts 
failed, Vergennes betrayed an emotion of relief. " I regard 
it as a special piece of good fortune," this benefactor of 
America wrote, '" and as the effect of the happy star of the 
House of Bourbon, that the English Ministry in the intoxi- 
cation of its hopes rather than of its succe.sses has so cir- 
cumscribed itself by the acts which it has caused Parliament 
to pass, that it has no power to grant this independence 
which it foresees that it will be obliged to let slip."'* In 
order to make sure that the overtures on the other side of 
the water should be equally unsuccessful, a King's frigate 
carried to Boston despatches of the Deputies, reporting the 
proposals of the British emissaries, and warning Congress 
of the advances to be made through the Howes. 

While the interviews between Deane and Wentworth were 
takingplace, the Commissioners impressed upon Vergennes the 
importance of their knowing, at a time when England seemed 
on the point of proposing peace, what the United States 
might expect from France and Spain. This was the critical 

' Vergennes to Montmorin, Kvening of Dec. 13, 1777. Stevens 
Facsimiles, 1776. 

nbid., 177S, 718, 719, 231, 17S0, 1781, 1786, etc. 

' Vergennes to Montmorin, Dec. 19, 1777. Doniol, II. p. 662. 



Tlie Conclusion of tlie Tyeaty . 65 

question which Vergennes thought would justif}- him in pro- 
ceeding without the concurrence of S[)ain. He informed the 
CommissicMiers through Gerard, on the seventeenth (jf De- 
cember, that the King had resolved to acknowledge their in- 
dei)endence and to make a treaty with them.' As His 
Majesty aimed to found a permanent alliance, advantageous 
to both peoples, and not to exact concessions because he was 
dealing with a new nation, the terms of the treaty would be 
liberal. In supporting the independenci.- of the United 
States, the King would jirobably be drawn into war with 
England ; yet he would ask no compensation, and France 
would seek her advantage in diminishing the power of Great 
Britain. The Commissioners, in their report to the Com- 
mittee of Foreign Affairs, ' represented Gerard as saying that 
the King would not insist on a stipulation forbidding a 
separate peace, and would require only that the Americans 
should not give up their independence. This interpretation 
of the King's intentions gave rise to one of the earliest de- 
bates of Congress on our duty to our ally. At the time of 
the discussion, Gerard denied that he had made the state- 
ment ; and it seems more probable that he was misunder- 
stood than that France contemplated any such half-way 
measure. Gerard did not fix a date for beginning the 
negotiations, but promised that the treaty should be con- 
cluded as soon as Spain was ready to join the alliance. 

While the Ministry waited for the decision of the Spanish 
Court, important events were occurring in Kngland. When 
Parliament adjourned, to meet on the twentieth of Januar}', 
Lord North announced that he would propose a plan of 
reconciliation at the opening of the next session.' It 
seemed improbable that the North Ministry would offer 
America complete indejxMideuce ; but Vergennes feared that 
they would gain their point by yielding the substance while 
withholding the name. Granting that reconciliation on 
these terms might be difficult if the American government 

' I-'ranklin, Deane, and Lee to Coiuinittee of I'\)reign .Aflairs, Dec. 
18, 1777. Diplomatic Correspondence, II, p. 452. 
■* Succe.ssor to the Committee of vSecret Correspondence. 
■' Noailles to Vergennes, Dec. 23, 1777. Stevens Facsimiles, 1793. 

5 



66 France and the American Revolutioii . 

had more influence and stability, he feared that the people, 
sufTering' for the necessaries of life, would not continue the 
war for a point of honor. "The Americans jM'opose that 
we should conquer the linj^lish islands," said he, "and 
grant them free trade thither. If, on the other hand, the 
Knglish make the .same proposal, will it not l)e listened to? 
will it be rejected?" He confessed that the views of the 
French government had been too restricted ; they had 
feared a change in the British Ministry, and had not 
anticipated the consecjuences of a change in the policy of 
the Ministry now in power. "England's aim being no 
longer doubtful," he said, "it .seems that neither should 
our decision be .so ; for the question we have to decide is to 
know whether it is more expedient forusto have war against 
England and America together, than with America for us 
against England."' In writing to the and^a.ssador at Lon- 
don, he spoke with more hesitancy, as if trying to draw out 
information. " What would be important to find out is with 
wdiat view the Mini.stry seems to incline to peace ; many 
people believe, and wish to make us believe, that it would be 
fatal to us in the present and in the future. ... I confess 
to you that I am not far from that way of thinking."' 
Yielding to the.se apprehensions, Vergennes engaged Gerard 
in drawing up a plan of treaty, and Gerard began to dis- 
cuss with the Deputies the several articles of the Congres- 
sional plan.'' It was not thought worth while even to con- 
ceal their interviews. The customary precautions for en- 
suring secrecy were relaxed, and Franklin was observed in 
the company of all the ministers in turn, dining and ne- 
gotiating with them.' 

On the last day of the year, Vergennes received the 
answer of the Spanish Court. ' It could hardly have been 
less complaisant under any circumstances, and it might 

' Vergenne.s to Montmorin, Dec. 27, 1777. Stevens Facsiniile.s, 1S05. 
''Vergennes to Noailles, Dec. 27. Ibid., 1807. 

■'Arthur Lee's Journal, Dec 29. 1777, and subsequent dates. Life, 
I, pp. 371 flf- 

' Correspondance Secrete, L P- 125. 

^Florida Blanca to d'Aranda, Dec. 23, 1777. Doniol, H, p. 765. 



The Concludon of the Treaty. 67 

liave been more so if the vSpaiiisli authorities liad not lieard 
of the advances which the French Court had ah-ead}- made 
to the Americans. On receiving this news, Fh)ri(Ui Blanca, 
a statesman characterized by extreme reserve, was betrayed 
into an exph)sion of anger. Montmorin assured him that 
no formal negotiation had been opened, took ])ains to soothe 
his injured vanity, and flattered himself that he had suc- 
ceeded and that Spain would soon follow in the steps of 
France ; ' but the length of time which elap.sed before 
Spain, on her own exorbitant terms, entered the war, bore 
witness that she did not easily forget an injury or \ield a 
purpose. 

In his reply to France,' I'lorida Blanca expressed a strong 
doubt whether an early reconciliation between Great Bri- 
tain and America was probable. In conversation, just be- 
fore this, he had given luigland four years t<^ come to 
terms with her Colonies. He made allowance for the fact 
that the Americans had an interest in exaggerating the 
likelihood of an agreement. " The American Dejmties are 
playing their game. Their aim has always been to com- 
promise us with the Fnglish."'' Repeating an argument 
often used by Spanish statesmen, he said that an alliance 
between America and the Bourbons would give the British 
Ministry the best possible excuse for ending the war, — the 
plea of nece.ssit}', and of perfidy on the part of PVance and 
Spain. The outcome of his argument was that Spain 
would engage to do nothing except fix the amount of her 
subsidy to the Americans, offer them her mediation in ca.se 
of need, and watch the English Ministry. 

On learning the Spanish decision, the advi.sers of the 
King carefully di.scussed the situation. Vergennes then 
sent the Court of Spain an elaborate reply,' and the King 
added the weight of his influence by a personal letter to his 
tincle. Vergennes declared the vSpanish proposals in- 

' IVIoiilinorin to Vergeinie.s, Dec. 23, 1777. Stevens I'^acsimiles, 
1792. 
'Florida Blanca to d'Araiida, Dec. 23, 1777. Doniol, II, p. 765. 
^ Montmorin to Vergennes, Dec. 23. vStevens I-'acsiniiles, 1792. 
'Jan. 7, 1778. Ibid., 1S24. 



68 France and the American Revolution . 

adequate. Pecuniary aid had served to keep up the 
hopes of the iusurgeuts ; but now that the desired end 
was witliin their reach, money would not prevent them 
from forming a coahtion with Enghind. Me(hation would 
be useless and dangerous, for England would regard it as 
an insult. Besides, she was now offering the Colonies all 
that France and Spain could procure for them ; for media- 
tion based on absolute independence would amount to a 
declaration of war against Ivigland. To offer a guaranty 
would be equally useless ; for both England and the C(.»lo- 
nies, if they treated without the intervention of France and 
Spain, would reject their guaranty. As to watching for a 
change of ministry in England, Lord North was now more 
likely to bring about a war against France than Eord 
Chatham. A treaty, then, was absolutely necessary. 
France must begin negotiations before " the ominous date 
of the twentieth." 

On the independence of America, Vergennes exjMessed 
his opinion plainly. "The United States are in fact inde- 
pendent. They have in their hands all that constitutes 
.sovereign power. Our recognition will add nothing to the 
reality of that possession." Without asserting this inde- 
pendence, France was prepared to assume it for the purpo.ses 
of the alliance. vSlie desired a treaty consisting of two parts : 
the first establishing a commercial agreement ; the second 
providing for an eventual alliance, " to procure absolute and 
unlimited independence to the United States." France 
would require that the Americans should not make peace 
secretly or without her guaranty ; and the two powers would 
guarantee each other's American possessions. The King 
might be obliged to sign a treaty before hearing from Spain 
again. In that ca.se, Vergennes promised to reserve the 
right of Spain to accede to it at any time. One reason for 
ha.stening the negotiation was Vergennes' suspicion that, 
even at this late stage, the Deputies were withdrawing their 
confidence. " What a humiliation . . . if after having the 
opportunity to attach the Americans to ourselves, we should 
have reason to reproach ourselves with having attached them 
to England. ... I do not know," he said, "whether I 



The Couihision of i/ie Treaty. 69 

could ,survi\-e the shame of .si*;iiiiig the passport which the 
Deputies would ask of nie to go to London." ' 

"As it is not we who will and act, but circumstances 
which imperiouslx- dictate the law to us," \'ergennes wrote 
to the ambassador in Spain, in this letter of Januar>- 8, "to- 
morrow will not pass without my informing the Americans 
of our tlis])osition and endeavoring to penetrate theirs." He 
was better than his word. On the evening of the same day, 
Gerard held a conference with the Conunissioners. Binding 
them to secrecy, he told them that the King had resolved to 
assist the United States in maintaining their independence. 
After warning them against the designs of Kngland, Gerard 
asked them two definite questions : first, what they would 
regard as sufficient to ensure their rejecting all English pro- 
posals which did not include absolute independence ; second, 
what they believed necessary to cause Congress to reject all 
such proposals. The Commissioners replied to the first 
question, that a treaty of commerce and alliance would be 
sufficient.' Gerard told them that tlie King, anticipating 
this answer, had decided to conclude a treaty ; and that the 
formal negotiations should begin wdienever they wished. At 
their request, he made a brief .statement of the terms which 
would be agreeable to France, following the lines of Ver- 
gennes' despatch to the Spanish Court. The policy of the 
commercial treaty, he said, would not differ materially from 
that of the Congressional plan. He explained that the King 
woidd not require any compensation for his support; and that, 
since his motive was not desire for conquest, France could 
not co-operate with America for the reduction of Canada and 
the West Indies."' In spite of this limitation, the Deputies 
felt that the main object of their endeavor was gained. 
They "applauded this recital," Gerard reported, " with a 
sort of transport." 

Three days later, Deane gave Gerard the answer of the 
Commissioners to his second question.^ To prevent Con- 

' Verge nil e.s to Moiitiiiorin, Jan. 8, 1778. Doiiiol, II, ]>. 719. 

■■' Stevens F'acsimiles, 774. 

'Journal of Arthur Lee. Life, I, p. 377. 

*Jan. II, 1778. Stevens l''acsiiiiiles, 776. 



yo France and the American Revolution. 

gress from making peace with England, they said it would 
be necessary that France should guarantee the territories 
then in possession of the United States and those acquired 
during the war, and either declare war against England or 
provide Congress with enough money to carry on the strug- 
gle until the British should be expelled from the continent. 
A fleet of six or eight ships of the line would make doubh' 
sure, by procuring the success of the Americans. In 
making the.se requests, the Commissioners a.sked for more 
than they could hope to obtain ; for they had been told that 
immediate war formed no part of the King's plan. Ver- 
gennes was annoyed. "These people," he said, "show 
themseh^es infinitely more troublesome and more moro.se 
than we could have thought.'" 

After the interview just described, the negotiation went 
on with little delay. On the eighteenth of January, the 
treaties drawn up by \'ergennes were submitted to the 
Deputies, who deliberated on them for ten days* and, after 
obtaining some changes in minor points, accepted them. 
The principal matter of di.scussion was the nature of the 
alliance ; the Americans wishing to make it actual, the 
French insisting that it must be eventual. Of course the 
Commissioners were obliged to yield. 

While France was entering on the la.st stage of her ne- 
gotiation with the Americans, the Spani.sh Ministry were 
preparing an elaborate .set of questions for discussion. They 
took this step, apparently, with a double aim : to gain time ; 
and to give a forcible hint that Spain would not prosecute a 
war for the mere humiliation of England, but would insist 
on substantial advantages.' This promising document had 
.scarcely been completed, when the French nicnioire of Jan- 
uary 8 arrived, to convince the Spaniards that their efforts 
were useless, for the measure which they were trying to 
delay had probably been adopted. The natural irritation of 
the baffled statesmen found vent in criticism of their ally. 
The Court of F'^rance had not performed its agreements ; it 

' Vergenncs to Montinorin, Jan. i6, 1778. SteveiLS Facsimiles, 183S. 
■•'See Arthur Lee's Journal, Jan., 1778. Life, L pp- 377 ff- 
^Florida Blanca to d'Aranda, Jan. 13, 177S. Doniol, U, p. 775. 



Tilt' Co)irlusio)i of flu: Treaty . 71 

had compelled Spain to change her whole plan of war, with 
the result that her colonies were ill defended ; it had " ob- 
served neither secrecy, moderation nor neutrality in any re- 
spect as to the Americans. ... In a matter of so grave 
importance,"— thus ran the .Spanish arraignment, — " it has 
followed no swstem or plan, since at one time it worked 
openly and with great zeal in favor of the Colonies, and at 
another, had resort to condescensions by no means becoming, 
on the slightest complaint or insinuation of the British Cabi- 
net.'" In this light, the temporizing policy of France 
apjieared to her ally. Spain was not left long in doubt of 
the outcome of that ]Kjlicy. On January 30, Vergennes 
wrote to Montmorin that the treaties were practically com- 
pleted ; and on the sixth of February, the month which, 
half a year before, \"ergennes had set as a limit l)evond 
which delay would be disastrous, they were signed and 
sealed. 

The Treaty of Amity and Conunerce followed, in its main 
lines, the plan of Congress and the specific modifications 
contained in the instructions of the Commissioners. The 
plan provided for nuitual exemption from all duties on im- 
ports except those wdiich each state required of its own citi- 
zens. France declined to become a party to this agreement, 
and the privileges of the most favored nation were substi- 
tuted, each party reserving liberty to admit other nations to 
the same advantages. An attempt was made to provide for 
reciprocal exemptions between the United States and the 
We.st Indies. This met with objections on the part of one 
member of the Commission and two of his countrymen who 
were admitted into the secret. After the di.scussion had done 
as much harm as possible by exciting ill feeling among the 
Americans, an effort was made to have the articles in 
question omitted. They were left untouched, with the un- 
derstanding that Congress might ratify them or not, w-ithout 
prejudice to the rest of tlie treaty, and were finally rejected. 
France reserved her share in the Newfoiuidland fishery, as 

' Mhnoirt' to be read in Council of Ministers, Jan. 22, 1778. Sparks 
MvSS., CII. 



72 l^^rancc o)id the America )i Revolution. 

stipulated in tlie treaty of Paris ; and each nation renounced 
the right to fish on the grounds l)eh)nging to the otlier. 

More important to the world at large than tlie commer- 
cial privileges and fisliing rights conv^eyed by the treaty 
were the rules which it laid down for the regulation of trade 
in time of war. The principle that " free ships make free 
goods" was adopted ; and the term 'contraband' was re- 
stricted to arms, munitions, accoutrements, and horses.' 

A treaty of defensive alliance" supplemented the commer- 
cial agreemeut and ensured protection to the trade thereby 
authorized. The alliance, eventual in its nature as long as 
Great Britain and France remained at peace, should become 
actual on the outbreak of hostilities between them, if this 
occurred during the American war. The aim of the alliance 
was declared to be, to maintain effectually the libert}', sov- 
ereignty, and independence of the United States. Kach 
nation bound itself to attack the enemy separately and, on 
request, to assist its ally as much as po.ssible. The rights of 
the two powers to conquests in America were defined : the 
United States claiming any which they might make in the 
northern part of America, or the Bermuda Islands ; while 
France reserved the right to take any of the English islands 
in or near the Gulf of Mexico. The articles containing 
the.se reservations were expressed in general terms, although 
the corresponding passage in the Congressional plan named 
specifically the territories and islands which the United 
States desired to possess : among them, Florida, Newfound- 
land, Cape Breton, and St. Johns. This change caused the 
same men who protested against the reciprocity articles to 
suspect that France wished " to leave an opening for nego- 
tiating Florida into the pos.session of Spain " at a general 
peace, and for excluding the United States from the islands 
which command the Newfoundland fisheries.' Their ob- 
.stinac}' in clinging to this suspicion was a .source of annoy- 

'Secret Journals of Congress, II, ]). 59. 

Mbid., II, p. 82. 

^ Ralph Izard to Arthur Lee, May 18, 1778. A. Lee to Izard, May 
23. Izard to Henry Laurens, June 28, vSept. 12. John Adams to Izard, 
Oct 2. Diplomatic Correspondence, II, pp. 586, 594, 629, 713, 753. 



The Conrhtsioii of the Treaty. 73 

aiice to the negotiators at the tune, and has since been treat- 
ed b}' some of the ablest historians as wholly nnjnstified ; 
but the instructions given to Gerard, the first French minis- 
ter to the United vStates, show that France preferred to see 
F'lorida, at least, in the hands of vSjjain.' 

The parties to the treat)' bound themselves tO' conclude no 
peace without mutual consent, and not to la\' down their 
arms until the independence of the United States had been 
" formally or tacitly" assured. They renounced in advance 
all claim to compensation. They mutually guaranteed their 
American possessions ; and France guaranteed the inde- 
pendence of the United vStates from the moment of a rupture 
with Kngland or, in case no such breach should occur, from 
the close of the American war. A separate article gave the 
King of Spain the right to accede to the treaties at pleasure. 

Vergennes thought at the time of the negotiation that, 
owing to the natural difficulty of keeping such a secret, the 
Americans would hear of the treaty by the end of April 
or the beginning of Ma}' ; so he decided to announce it 
to England at that time." Rut, before the date set, he 
began to fear that Congress would not hear of it early 
enough to prevent them from listening to the British propo- 
sitions. As news reached America more surely and quickly 
by way of the English newspapers than when .sent direct 
from France, he determined to ainiounce the treaty to 
England even earlier than he had intended. Rumors of 
the negotiation had reached England before it was concluded, 
and news of the signing was i)romptly conveyed to the 
British Cabinet by agents who were always ready to 
carry reports across the Channel. But the existence of the 
treaty was positively known to only a few people ; and the 
doubt thrown upon it by the British Ministry indicated that 
concealment was desired b}' England and, as a natural con- 
sequence, that an announcement would be advantageous to 
France. So the ambassador at London received orders to 
declare the treaty ; and, for fear that the British govern- 

' Gerard's In.structions, approved March 29. 177.S. Vergennes lo 
Gerard, Oct. 26. Doniol, III, pp. 155, 156. 

' Vergeinies to Montmorin, Jan. 30, 1778. Ibid., II, ]x 791. 



74 /''ra?ice and tlic Ameyican Revolution. 

nieiit iniglit conceal the facts, lie was instructed to let noth- 
ing prev'cnt him from allowing the secret to leak out in 
private conversation the next daj-.' The announcement 
was made on the thirteenth of March. The Treaty of 
Amity and Commerce was communicated with insolent un- 
concern ; and Ivngiand was informed that France and the 
United States had also entered into an engagement for the 
protection of their connnerce.^ Within a week, both Eng- 
land and France recalled their ambassadors, and war had 
virtually begun. 

In announcing the treaty so early, France ignored the re- 
quest of Spain that it be concealed until July, to allow the 
return of her trooi)s and her treasure-fleet. In this way, 
another cause of offense was prepared ; but one more was 
of little consequence, where the points of disagreement were 
alread}' so many and important. Clearly, if France desired 
more aid than the minimum secured to her by the Family 
Compact, she must promote the exorbitant ambition of her 
ally. With the utmost frankness, d'Aranda had exposed 
the reason why Spain demanded so many advantages as the 
price of her a.ssi.stance. Her statesmen feared that, if 
war should break out and be continued until England 
made overtures of peace, France would " recjuire Spain to 
comply also, and to be content with the .same terms;" 
they believed "that the explanation of the purpo.ses of 
Spain having preceded, France would be obliged to sustain 
the undertaking until they should be carried out."' 

By the ratification of the treaties, which took place 
promptl}' on their arrival in America, France gained two 
important points : she bound the United States to continue 
the war until their independence was achieved, and to accept 
her guaranty. I>ut was it necessary that she should commit 
lier.self so decisively and, with reference to her other 

' Vergennesto Monlniorin, March 6, lo, 1778. VergeiinestoNoaillcs, 
March 10. Doniol, II, pp. 810, 813, 822, 826. 
2 Ibid., II, p. 823. 
'DAranda to Florida Blanca, Jan. 31, 1778. .Sparks MSS., CII. 



The Coiuii(sio!i of the Treaty. 75 

interests, so preinatureK', in order to seeure the end desired ? 
In other words, was there innninent danger of peaee between 
Kngland and Anieriea ? 

It is generally eoneeded that the United .States eonld ncjt 
have carried the strnggle to a snccessfnl issne withont the 
aid of France. vSnbniission nnist have come at last ; bnt, 
for the innnediate pnrpose of connteracting Lord North's 
Conciliatory Bills, the treaty which \'ergennes rushed to a 
conclusion without the concurrence of Spain, was super- 
finous. Lord North's propositions were not so ' conciliatory' 
as Vergennes' fears led him to believe : they did not hokl in 
reserve an offer of independence as a last resort. Hurried 
to America before their first reading in Parliament, they 
arrived in advance of the French treaty, onl)' to be re- 
jected.' France might have postponed her decision without 
serious danger. 

This decision was of fatal consequence to France. The 
immediate results were not the uio.st serious. The war in 
which France became involved, her difficult task as guardian 
of the conflicting interests of the United States and vSpain, 
the restoration of her prestige at the close of the war, — 
trials and gains alike tlwindle to incidents, beside the over- 
throw of her tottering finances and the impulse given to 
revolutionary sentiment at home. Of this result, Spain had 
warned her ; England herself had warned her. Ha5)pily 
for America, most unhappily for her own interests, she was 
deaf to the warning. "You are arming, imprudent mon- 
arch ; do you forget in what century, in what circumstances, 
and over what nation you reign ? . . . The legislators of 
America are proclaiming themselves disciples of the French 
philosophers ; they are executing what these have dreamed. 
Will not the French philosophers a.spire to be legislators in 
their own country ? Will principles which cannot be bent 
to English laws accord better with those on which your 
monarchy is based ? How dangerous to place the flower of 
your officers in communication with men enthusiastic for 
liberty ! You will take alarm, but too late, when you hear 

' Journals of Coiigres.s, II, pp. 521 flf. 



76 J '"ranee and the American Revolution . 

repeated in your court vague and specious axioms which 
they have meditated in the forests of America. . . . Eng- 
land will be only too well avenged for your hostile designs, 
when your government is examined, judged, and condemned 
according to the principles professed at Philadelphia and 
applauded in >-our cajiital.'" 

' Retranslated from the French. Quoted from a pamphlet pub- 
lished in England toward the end of 1777, said to have been inspired 
by the British Ministry. Lacretelle, //istoire de France, V, p. 82. 



A LIST OF Till' AUTHORITIKS CITKI) 
IN THIS THESIS. 



■v" Adams, Jf)iiN. The Works of : Willi a lift- of the aullior, notes and 
illustrations, hy Charles I'rancis Adams. lo vols. Boston. 1.S56. 

Bancroft, C.kokc.]';. History of the United States of America, from 
the Discovery of the Continent. 6 vols. New York. 1884-5. 

Bancroft, GeorCtIC. Manuscripts. Lenox Library, New York. 

Beaumarchai.s, see Chevallie and Lonienie. 

Capkkicue, J. B. H. R. Louis XVI son Administration et ses Rela- 
tions Di])lomatiques avec 1' Europe. 4 vols. Bruxelles, 1844. 

Chev.\llie, p. J. Claim of Beaumarchais' Heir against the United 
States. Washington, 181 7. 

Colleville, Vicomte de. Les Missions Secretes du General-Major 
Baron de Kalb et son Role dans la Guerre de I'lndepejidance 
Americaine. Paris, 1855. 

CoNCRESS, see Journals and vSecrel Journals. 
CorrESPondance Secrete, see de Lescure. 
Correspondence;, Diplomatic, see Wharton. 

DE.A.NE Papers. Collections of the New York Historical vSociety for 
the year 1886. New York, 1887. 

DONIOL, Henri. Histoire de la Particii)ation de la P'rance a I'PUa- 
blissement des Etats-Unis d'Amerique. Correspondance diplo- 
matique et documents. 5 vols. Paris, 1886-92. 

Durand, John, editor. New Materials for the History of the Ameri- 
can Revolution. New York, 1889. 

FiSKE, John. The American Revolution. 2 vols. Boston, 1891. 

> Flass.\n, Gae;t.\n de Raxis, Comte de. Histoire Generale et Rai- 
sonnee de la Diplomatic I'>an9aise, ou de la Politique de la France, 
deptiis la Fondation de la Monarchie, jusqu' a la Fin du Regne de 
Louis XVL 7 vols. Paris, 1811-29. 

Franklin, The Complete Works of. John Bigelow, editor. 10 
vols. New York and London, 1887-8. 

Fr.\nklin, see Parton. 



78 France and the American Revohition . 

^' Journals OK riiK AMiiKiCAN CoNGKivSS. From 1774 to 177S. 4 vols. 
Washington, 1S23. 

Kalb, see Collevillc and Kapp. 

Kapp, I'kihdrich. The Ijfe of John Kalb, Major-Gcneral in the 
Revolutionary Army. New York, 18S4. 

Lacrktki,LK, Charij-;s. Histoirede I'-rance jicndant Ic Dix-huitieme 
Siecle. 6 vols. Paris, iSio. 

Laka\}';ttic, Memoirs, Correspondence and IManiiscripts of. Pub- 
lished 1)3' his family. New York, 1837. 

Leckv, \V. E. H. a History of England in the Eighteenth Century. 
8 vols. New York, 1878. 

Lee, Arthur. See Lee, Charles Henry and Richard Henry. 

LKK, Charles Henry. A Vindication of Arthur Lee, Former Rep- 
resentative of the Province of Massachusetts Ba}', at London. 
Richmond, Va., 1894. 

Lee, Richard Henry. Life of Arthur Lee. 2 vols. Boston, 1829. 

Lescures, M. F. a. de. Corre.spondance Secrete Inedite sur Louis 
XVL Marie Antoinette, la Cour, et la Ville, de 1777 a 1792. 2 
vols. Paris, 1866. 

LOMrCNiE, Louis de. Beaumarchais and his Times. vSketches of 
French society in the eighteenth century, from unpublished doc- 
uments. Translated by Henry S. Edwards. 4 vols. London, 
1856. 

Mahon, Lord. (Stanhope.) History of England from the Peace of 
Utrecht to the Peace of Versailles. 7 vols. London, 1851. 

Manuscripts, see Bancroft, Sparks and Stevens. 

Memoirs, see Lafayette, S6gur, Soulavie, and Vergennes. 

Parkman, P^r.^nCIS. A Half-Century of Conflict. 2 vols. Boston, 

1893. 
Parton, J.\mes. Life and Times of Benjamin Franklin. 2 vols. 

Boston. 
Secret Journals ok the Acts and Procep;dings of Congress. 

2 vols. Boston, 1820-1821. 

SEGUR, Louis Philippe, LE Comtp: de. Memoires ou Souvenirs et 
Anecdotes. 2 vols. Paris, 1S44. 

SEGUR, Louis Philippe, l'Aine. Politique de Tons les Cabinets de 
I'Europe, pendant les Regnes de Louis XV et de Louis XVI. 3, 
vols. Paris, 1801. 



.1 It //i or /firs Cift'd i)i this Thesis. 79 

Sorr.Aviic, JivAX I, oris, i/AIni;. Memoires Historiqucs el Poliliques 
(hi RC'i^iie (le I/niis XVI, depuis son Manage jus(iu' a sa Mori. 
Paris, I. Sol. 

Sp.\RK.S, Jarkd. Manuscripts. Uhrary of Harvard I'niversilv. 

Stevens, B. F. Ivicsiniiles of Manuscripts in P<uro])eaii .Vrchives 
Relating to .Vmerica, 1773-1783. 23 vols. 1889-1S95. 

TuRC.cvr, OicuvKES. I'kliteurs, Eugene Daire el lIii)])olyte Dnssard. 
2 vols. Paris, 1S44. 

Vercennes, Memoiriv Hi.stokiou]'; et Por.iriouE sur i^a L,oi;isi- 

ANE. 

Wharton, Francis, editor. The Revolutionary Diplomatic Corre- 
s{)ondence of the United States. 6 vols. Washington, 1889. 

Witt, Cornicus de. Thomas Jefferson. l<;tude liistorique sur la 
Democralie Americaine. I'aris. 1861. 



INDEX. 



Adams, John, advises Dfclaration 
of Iiulepeiidencc and treaties 
with foreign powers, 1 7 ; inein- 
ber of Committee on plan of 
treaty, wishes commercial treaty 
only, 43 ; objects to alliance, 50. 

Adams, Samuel, advises Declara- 
tion of Inde])endence, 17. 

AigLiillon, d', foreign jiolicy of, 1 1. 

Alliance between I-'raJice and 
America, nieasnres leading to, 
advocated in 176.S, ro ; not de- 
sired by S])ain, 39 ; considered 
by Vergennes, 39, 44 ; nrged by 
Beaumarchais, 41 ; objections of 
Vergennes and Grimaldi, 4S ; of- 
fered by Congress, 49 ; France 
wishes proposals for, 60 ; nature 
of, actual or eventual, 63, 65, 70 ; 
Florida Blanca objects to, 67 ; 
terms of, 72. .SV'^ Treaty. 

.Ambassadors, motion to send to 
France, 17 ; withdrawn l)y En- 
gland and France, 74. 

Ainphitiite, 33-34. 

Aranda, d", 39, 40, 46, 74. 

Armaments, a causeof jealousy, 5.S. 

Beaumarchais, collects informa- 
tion, 19 ; urges the King to aid 
America, 19, 21 ; replies to Lord 
Rochford, 25 ; advises a loan 
to the Americans, 26; receives 
1,000,000 livres from F'rench 
Treasury, 27 ; agreement with 
Deanc, 31 ; obtains supplies from 
royal arsenals, 32 ; advises send- 
ing bVench officers to America, 
32 ; sends cargoes to America, 
32, 33 ; receives money from 
vSpain and France, 34 ; claim 
against United vStates, 34-37 ; 
plan for aiding Americans, 36 ; 
desires recognition of Ameri- 
cans, 41 ; connnent on capitula- 
tion of Burgoyne, 61. 

Bermuda Islands, right of conquest 
reserved to United Stales, 72. 

Bonvouloir, instructions, 16; sails 
for America, 17 ; meets the Com- 
mittee of vSecret Correspondence, 
18 ; report reaches France, 21. 



British Ministry, measures dis- 
please American Colonists, ^ ; 
distrusted by Vergennes, 14 ; 
protest against ])rohibited trade, 
20 ; may desire foreign war, 23 ; 
to be cajoled, 23 ; learn secrets 
of French Cabinet, 51-52 ; pro- 
test against tolerance of Ameri- 
can privateers, 55 ; demand re- 
versal of policy, 57 ; conduct, a 
cause of satisfaction to Vergen- 
nes, 64 ; change of policj- feared, 
73 ; throw doubt on I'rench 
treaty, 73. 

Burgoyne's capitulation, 59 ; effect 
on French Ministry, 60. 

Canada, effect of cession to En- 
gland, I, 2; mentioned in Bon- 
voidoir's instructions, 16 ; de- 
mand for retrocession consid- 
ered, 52, 54 ; King will not aid 
Americans to conquer, 69. 

Chase, of Maryland, moves to send 
ambassadors to France, 17. 

Chatelet, du, discusses American 
aft'airs with Choi.seul, 8, 9 ; plans 
informal connnercial agreement 
with Americans, 10. 

Chatham, Uord, 63, 68. 

Choiseul, enmity toward England, 
3, 4, 1 1 ; alliances with Austria 
and Spain, 4 ; sends agents to 
America, 5, 7 ; hints at new plans 
with reference to America, 6 ; 
predicts American Revolution, 
7 ; receives de Kalb coldly, 9 ; 
reconmiends commercial rela- 
tions with Americans, 1 1 ; goes 
into exile, 1 1 ; opposes Vergen- 
nes, 41 ; policy, 52. 

Colonies, Turgot's views of, 23-24. 

Commercial intercourse between 
French and American citizens 
proposed by Frances and du 
Chatelet, 10 ; approved by Coun- 
cil, II ; opposed by Spain, 11 ; 
existence of, known, 19; British 
protests against, 25. 

Commis-sioners to France, appoint- 
ed, 44 ; audience with Vergennes, 
46 ; dissensions, 46 ; popularity, 



82 



Index. 



47 ; submit proposed treat}' to 
Vergennes, 47 ; additional in- 
structions, 48 ; urge I'rance to 
declare war, 49 ; personal pledge 
of, 49 ; expect war, 5 1 ; Vergen- 
nes complains of, 57 ; ask loan, 
58 ; congratulated l)y King. 60 ; 
request answer to their ])roposals, 
61, 64; important conferences 
with Gerard, 65, 69 ; answer 
question about Congress, 70 ; 
deliberate on the treaties, 70. 

Connnittee of Foreign Affairs, 65. 

Committee of Secret Correspond- 
ence, formation of, 17; instruc- 
tions to Arthur Lee, 17 ; to 
Charles Dumas, 18; appoint Silas 
Deane commercial and political 
agent, 30. 

Committee to draw up plan of 
treaties, 43. 

Congress, Continental, delegates 
elected, 14 ; debates on inde- 
pendence and foreign alliances, 
17; Heaumarchais writes to, 32; 
said to be treating with Howe, 
33 ; Resolution of May 15, 37 ; 
debates on alliance, 43 ; relieved 
by French loan, 49; offers alli- 
ance to France, 49 ; inducements 
to France and vSpain, 50 ; author- 
izes capture of British vessels, 
54 ; measures necessary to pre- 
vent from making peace, 69-70. 
See Committee. 

Contraband, defined in Treaty of 
i77«, 72. 

De.-\ne, Sil.\s, sent to France by 
Committee of Secret Correspond- 
ence, 30 ; instructions, 31 ; audi- 
ence with \'ergennes, 31 ; agree- 
ment with Beaumarchais, 32 ; 
announces Resolution of May 
15, 37 ; memorial on American 
trade, 37 ; asks recognition for 
Uniled vStates, 41 ; joint Com- 
missioner to France, 44 ; notifies 
l-'rance of Declaration of Inde- 
pendence, 44 ; interviews with 
British agent, 64. See Commis- 
sioners. 

Declaration of Independence, de- 
sired by John and vSamuel Adams, 
17 ; delay in receiving news of, 
33 ,41 ; Resolution of May 15. 37 ; 
feared by cautious members of 
Congress, 43 ; ofiicial announce- 



ment, 44 ; influence on public 
opinion in France, 44. 

Deputies. See Conmiissioners. 

Dubourg, obtains aid for America, 
26. 

Dumas, instructed by Committee 
of Secret Correspondence, 18 ; 
requests mediation of France, 30. 

Durand, di.scusses effect of a revo- 
lution in America, 5 ; cultivates 
Franklin's acquaintance, 6; 
thinks revolution will be grad- 
ual, 6. 

Famii.v Compact, Third, 4, 22, 74. 

Farmers General, ap]:)roached by 
Dubourg, 27 ; contract with 
American Commissioners, 51. 

Florida, Vergennes tempts Spain 
with, 62 ; suspicion that France 
wished Spain to possess, 72 ; evi- 
dence, 73. 

Florida Blanca, plan of interven- 
tion in American quarrel, 53 ; 
suggests recovery of territory, 
54 ; anger at French policy, 67 ; 
thinks peace between England 
and America unlikely, 67. 

Franklin, Benjamin, suspicious of 
France, 6 ; receives friendly hint 
from Garnier, 15 ; member of 
Conmiittee on plan of treaty, 43 ; 
joint Commissioner to France, 
44 ; arrives in Paris, 46 ; popu- 
larity, 47 ; negotiates with the 
Ministry, 66. ..S't'^ Conmiissioners. 

G.\RNiHR, 14, 15. 

Gerard, endorses Beaumarchais, 
31 ; receives explanation from 
Vergennes, 36 ; gives informa- 
tion about Beaumarchais, 37 ; re- 
ports King's decision to Com- 
missioners, 65 ; statement about 
separate peace, 65 ; draws up 
plan of treaty, 66 ; important 
conference with Commissioners, 
69 ; instructions, on Florida, 73. 

Germaine, Lord, 63. 

Germaiitown, Battle of, impresses 
Vergennes, 62. 

(ribraltar, desired by Spain, 56. 

Grand, statement about supplies 
sent by Beaumarchais, 35. 

Grimaldi, suggests attack on Kn- 
gland, 22 ; objects to American 
alliance, 48. 

Guaranties in Treaty of 1778, 73. 



Index. 



83 



Guaranty of American rights by 
France and Spain, suggested bj- 
\'ergennes, 56 ; apj^roved by 
Spain, 56 ; no hope of, through 
Commissioners, 57 ; Holker's in- 
structions on, 59 ; proposed as 
part of treaty, 63 ; offer of, with- 
out treaty, useless, 68. 

Guines, de, 15, 16. 

Gulf of Mexico, islaiuls near, right 
of coiu|uest reserved to hVance, 
72. 

IlENRV, Patrick, predicts alH- 
ance with France, Spain, and 
Holland, 17. 

Holker, instructions of, 59-61. 

Independence of the United 
States, foreseen, i, 2, 5, 6, 9 ; 
interest of France in, 5, 7, 10, 11, 
20 ; mentioned in Bonvouloir's 
instructions, 16 ; advantage of 
recognizing, 6r ; King ready to 
acknowledge, 65 ; Vergennes as- 
serts, 68 ; France anxious to se- 
cure, 69 ; object of alliance of 
1778, 72 ; guaranteed, 73. See 
Declaration. 

Jamaica, 40. 

Jefferson, Thomas, declines a]:)- 

pointment as joint Commissioner 

to France, 44. 
Jerseys, retreat through, effect on 

Congress, 49. 

Kalb, de, secret mission to Ameri- 
ca, 7 ; reports, 7-8 ; cold recep- 
tion on return, g. 

Lafayette, comment on Choi- 
seul's treatment of de Kalb, 9 ; 
goes to America, 42 ; criticizes 
Vergennes, 53. 

Lee, Arthur, instructed by Com- 
mittee of Secret Correspondence, 
17 ; interviews with French am- 
bassador, 30 ; statements bearing 
on Keaumarchais claim, 35, 36 ; 
joint Commissioner to France, 
44 ; arrives in Paris, 46 ; goes to 
Spain, 53. See Commissioners. 

Loan, by France, 49 ; requested and 
refused, 50 ; obtained from I'\'irm- 
ers General, 51 ; requested bv 
Congress, 58. See Subsidy. 



Long Lsland, Battle of, effect on 
French Ministry, 33, 40, 41. 

Louis XVL character, 13 ; Coiuicil, 
13 ; opposes ])lans of lieaumar- 
chais, 19 ; approves Vergennes' 
iiieiiioire on America, 24 ; influ- 
enced b\- public o]Mnion, 42-43 ; 
advised by Grimaldi, 48 ; author- 
izes overtures to Commissioners, 
60 ; resolved to recognize Ameri- 
can indej)endence,65 '. intentions 
as to separate peace, 65; personal 
letter to King of Si)ain, 68 ; in- 
tentions rejiorted to Commis- 
sioners, 69. 

Mauri; I'AS, character, 13 ; replies 
to British complaint, 20 ; iirged 
to attack England, 39 ; remark 
on inflvience of ]iublic opinion, 
42 ; conversation with Lord Stor- 
mont, 58 ; congratulates Ccnn- 
missioners, 60. 

Mediation between Kngland and 
America, requested of France by 
Dumas, and refused, 30 ; sug- 
gested 1)}' Florida Blanca, 53 ; 
idea rejected by Vergennes, 53, 
68 ; Spain willing to offer, 67. 

Merchants, interested in American 
success, 42. 

Military class, republican theories, 
enthusiasm for America, 42. 

Minorca, 40. 

Montmorin, 63, 67, 71. 

Neutrality, advised by Turgot, 
24 ; considered by I'rench Min- 
istry, 52. 

Neutrals, rights of, 38 ; under 
Treaty of 1778, 72. 

Newfoundland fishery, in Treaty 
of 1778, 71 ; suspicion that France 
wished to exclude United States 
from, 72. 

North, Lord, 63 ; annoiuices plan 
of reconciliation, 65 ; likely to 
cause war with France, 68 ; terms 
rejected by Congress, 75. 

Officers, French, sent to America 
by advice of Beaumarchais, 32. 
Ossun, d', 47, 48. 

Pai'KR money, 49. 

Personal pledge of Connnis.sioners, 

49- 



84 



Index. 



Philosophers, sympathize with 
Americans, 42. 

Pontleroy, mission to America, 5. 

Portugal, French co-operation in 
conquest of, desired by Spain, 
22, 39 ; Congress offers to declare 
war against, 50. 

Privateering, American, 54 ; British 
demands for its repression, 57 ; 
these demands not official, 58. 

Public opinion in favor of Ameri- 
cans, 41 ; effect on I-Vench Min- 
istry, 42, 52. 

yuEEN, sym])athizes with Ameri- 
cans, 42. 

Ratification of Treaty oi' i 77S, 

74- 

Rayneval. Memorial on the Ameri- 
can question, 20. 

Reconeiliation between luigland 
and America, fear of, 8, 23, 33, 
40, 51. 55- 5«> 61-65, 68, 73, 75. 

Rochford, Lord, 15, 19, 25. 

Rodrique Hortalez and Companv, 
26. 

Secret agents sent to America, 
unknown officer, i ; Pontleroy, 
5 ; de Kail), 7 ; Bonvouloir, 16 ; 
Holker, 59. 

Secret Cabinet of Louis XV, ])lans 
invasion of England, 5. 

Secret proposals of peace from 
p;ngland, 51, 64. 

Separate Article, Treaty of 1778, 73. 

vSeparatc peace, Commissioners re- 
solve to stipulate against, 49 ; 
King's intentions, 65 : forbidden 
Vjy treaty, 73. 

vSpain, enters Family Compact, 4 ; 
warlike spirit aroused, 4 ; objects 
to trade relations with English 
Colonies, 1 1 ; desires aid of 
France against Portugal, and 
war with England, 22 ; willing 
to aid Americans, 24 ; fear of 
England, 28 ; desires territory, 
28, 54, 70 ; entrusts money to 
Beaumarchais, 34 ; wishes war 
with England, 39 ; objects to 
American alliance, 39, 48, 67 ; 
postpones war, 40 ; rejects ad- 
vances of Congress, 50 ; proposes 
offer of mediation, 53 ; wishes to 
guarantee American rights, 56 ; 
refuses to declare war, 56; wishes 



Gibraltar, 56 ; irritation at priva- 
teers, 58 ; sendsagent to America, 
59 ; refuses to fix amount of sub- 
sidy, 59 ; criticism of France, 70- 
71 ; right to accede to Treaty of 
'77''^- 73 i requests concealment 
of Treaty, 74 ; reason for de- 
mands, 74. 

Stamp Act, 5, 6. 

Stormont, Lord, persuaded that 
I'rance wishes peace, 20 ; pro- 
tests against Beaumarchais' ship- 
ments, 33 ; threatens to leave, 
46 ; discovers secrets of French 
Cabinet, 52 ; avoids an ultima- 
tum, 58. 

Subsidy to Americans, 59. See 
Beaumarchais. 

TicONDEROCA, abandonment of, 

5«. 

Treaty of 1763, 3, 28. 

Treaty of 1778, Congressional plan, 
43-44 ; resolved on by French 
Cabinet and King, 61-62 ; wishes 
of France concerning, 68 ; sub- 
mitted to Commissioners, de- 
bated, accepted, 70; signed, 71 ; 
terms of, 71-73 ; announced, 74 ; 
ratified, 74 ; consequences to 
France, 75. 

Turgot, minister of finance, 13 ; 
views aV)out colonies, 23 ; advises 
neutrality, 24 ; is dismissed, 27. 

Vergennes, predicts result of ces- 
sion of Canada, 2 ; policy of de- 
ception, 3 ; enters Cabinet, 12 ; 
previous career, 13 ; distrust of 
England, 14; foresees American 
independence, 15 ; advises de- 
fensive measures against En- 
gland and concessions to Ameri- 
cans, 16 ; replies to British com- 
plaint, 20 ; advises aid for Ameri- 
cans, 22-23 ; forVjids exportation 
of arms to America, 25 ; explains 
his motives, 28 ; receives Deane, 
31 ; letter on manner of helping 
Americans, 35 ; statements about 
supplies for America, 36-37 ; re- 
fuses information to United 
States government. 37 ; justifies 
reception of Deane, 38 ; proposes 
war as auxiliary of Spain, 39 ; 
guards against continental war, 
40 ; motives, 43 ; outlines j)olicy 
of France, 45 ; audience to Com- 



Index. 



85 



inissioners, 46 ; opinion of their 
proposals, 47 ; rejilies to tlicin, 
48 ; olijecliun to American alli- 
anct', 48 ; fears effect of T5ritish 
pro])osals, 51 ; ex])ects war, 51 ; 
iiieinonal on Canada ami Louisi- 
ana, 52 ; ])olicy of comjiromise, 
53 ; opposes S])anish proposals, 
53; checks American ]irivateers, 
55 ; wishes early dale for war, 
55 ; desires American alliance, 
,s6, 62 ; sn,<^,tjests and plans for 
guaranty of American rights, 56 ; 
criticizes I)e])ulies, 57 ; pre])ares 
to refuse British demands, and 
expects war, 57 ; advises sn])sidv 



to Americans, 58; discusses terms 
of treaty, 62; glad that British 
Ministry i-aunot grant independ- 
ence, 64 ; informsCommissioners 
that the King will treat, 65 ; re- 
monstrates with Spain, 67-68 ; 
states wishes of I'Vance concern- 
ing treaty, 68 ; annoyed at Ameri- 
can demands, 70 ; reasons for an- 
nouncing treaty, 73. 

Wkntworth, 64. 

West Indies, King will not helji 
Americans conquer, 69 ; discus- 
sion of duties on products, 71. 



LBJeXlB 









0^ 

■r. 



■■^■;. .^ 






-^■^r. 



■ . ' 



o'^ 'Cl. 



^0 O 






>■" o'^- 






\>' ^v. 






aX^"^> 



fi <, •/- 



x\ ., > ' " X V- 



• 0' 



^0 O 









^^ ■<:> 



.: ^ .VV 



\' < 



■^.■ ,^x^ 



\^^- 



// 



^ a\ 



A 






-?> '^^z 









.N^^ 



'y. 



-0- 






n.. <^^ 



..> ^'^^ 






o 0^ 



<^, C^ 



A^ 



- 



<:.. c^^ 



.,^-> ''^. 



■J- ,<\ 



vA 



A^ 






■^.■^ : 



<^- \ 









.-"^ I' I 



V. ..x^^ 






V -. ^ ' *■ ' 













■v 


''>■ 


C^^ 


^%%- 


^ '. 




"^ 














I . •-'> 



>^^ A^'^ 



[ LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 



I 

011 800 126 6 m 




